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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the pharmaceutical industry was crowned “the biggest defrauder of the
federal government,” as it surpassed the defense industry in False Claims Act1
recoveries for the first time in history.2 This dubious distinction is largely due to the
illegal promotional activities of pharmaceutical manufacturers, such as distributing
information on unapproved uses of their drugs and paying kickbacks to doctors to

* Assistant Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of
Law. B.S., University of Illinois; J.D., University of Michigan Law School. The author
would like to thank Ellen Podgor, Kathleen Boozang, Kevin Outterson, Sandra Johnson,
Thomas Greaney, Robert Gatter, Victor Romero, and Kit Kinports for comments on earlier
drafts of this Article. The author would also like to thank the participants of the SLU Health
Law Scholars Workshop, the Lutie A. Lytle Black Women Law Professors Conference, the
Delaware Valley, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia Feminist Law Teachers
Conference, and members of the faculty of Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School
of Law for attending a presentation on this Article. For research assistance, the author would
like to thank Tara Dittamo, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law Class of
2011. The author is appreciative of Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of
Law’s financial support during the writing of this Article.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006).
2. SAMMY ALMASHAT, CHARLES PRESTON, TIMOTHY WATERMAN & SIDNEY WOLF,
PUBLIC CITIZEN, RAPIDLY INCREASING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES AGAINST
PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY:
1991
TO
2010,
at
12
(2010),
THE
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ rapidlyincreasingcriminalandcivilpenalties.pdf. One of
the authors of the report, Sidney Wolfe, MD, is a member of the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration’s Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee. See Drug Safety
and Risk Management Advisory Committee Roster, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 29,
2011), http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/ Drug
SafetyandRiskManagementAdvisoryCommittee/ucm094892.htm.
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induce them to prescribe those drugs.3 The large recoveries are due in part to the
fact that the government has put the marketing practices of large pharmaceutical
companies, like Pfizer, under a microscope. The government spends years
investigating and building cases against pharmaceutical manufacturers that engage
in illegal promotional activities to market their drugs but does not prosecute them.
Instead, the government enters into Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs) with
pharmaceutical giants. By entering into these civil administrative settlements, the
pharmaceutical manufacturers are able to avoid the collateral consequences of
criminal conviction. Importantly, if a pharmaceutical manufacturer enters into a
CIA, the manufacturer will not be excluded from participation in federal health care
programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid,4 as they would upon conviction in most
cases. Medicare and Medicaid are significant sources of revenue for pharmaceutical
manufacturers. In return for remaining eligible for Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursements, the manufacturer pays the government a large fine and agrees to
structural changes that are designed to prevent future marketing violations.
The CIA seems like a reasonable solution to the problem of illegal promotional
activities because it employs a cooperative approach to compliance, but its use has
not led to demonstrable reductions in health care fraud. In part, this is because the
government has entered into multiple CIAs with some manufacturers, like Pfizer,
rather than seeking exclusion of those manufacturers that violate existing CIAs.
Thus, the message to manufacturers is that, as long as they are willing to pay large
fines and enact more compliance measures, the government will not exclude them
from Medicare and Medicaid, no matter how egregious the violation. While the
settlement amounts are often eye-popping—Pfizer settled for $2.3 billion5—the
reality is that these settlements are a small portion of overall profits. Nevertheless,
the government touts these settlements in the media as proof that they are tough on
health care fraud and abuse.6

3. ALMASHAT ET AL., supra note 2, at 18 (“From 1991 through 2005, unlawful
promotion constituted only 16 percent of all [health care fraud] violations, comprising only
$516 million in financial penalties. Over the past five years (2006–2010), unlawful
promotion came to comprise over half (53 percent) of all violations, totaling at least $3.3
billion in financial penalties, a six-fold increase in financial penalties for this violation
compared with the previous fifteen years. In comparison, total financial penalties for all
violations increased just three-fold over this same time period.”).
4. This Article uses Medicare and Medicaid as short hand for all federal health care
programs. A federal health care program is defined as any plan or program that provides
health benefits, whether directly, through insurance, or otherwise, which is funded directly,
in whole or in part, by the U.S. government or a state health care program. 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7b(f). The most significant federal health care programs are Medicare, Medicaid,
Tricare, and the Veterans programs.
5. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Justice Department
Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History: Pfizer to Pay $2.3 Billion
for Fraudulent Marketing (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2009pres/09/20090902a.html.
6. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bristol-Myers Squibb to Pay More Than
$515 Million to Resolve Allegations of Illegal Drug Marketing and Pricing (Sept. 28, 2007),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/September/07_civ_782.html; Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company to Pay U.S. $36 Million Relating to Off-Label
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The ultimate question is why is the government complicit in schemes to thwart
the statutory remedy of exclusion? Unfortunately, the alternative—exclusion of the
manufacturer from participation in Medicare and Medicaid—has devastating
consequences that spill over to innocent patients, employees, and stockholders. Not
only does the impact of the exclusion hit innocent third parties, but its imposition
on the manufacturer substantially outweighs the harm the manufacturer inflicts
through its improper marketing practices. The penalty for improperly marketing
one drug is blanket exclusion, or exclusion of all drugs produced by that
manufacturer, from Medicare and Medicaid. It is the government’s unwillingness
to harm innocent third parties and its reluctance to impose a disproportionate
penalty on drug manufacturers that leads them to CIAs. Thus, the real problem is
not that the government uses CIAs—it is that the government does not have
penalties of increasing severity to impose in place of exclusion. If the choice is
simply between a CIA and exclusion, the government will choose the CIA each
time to spare innocent third parties.
Despite the government’s compromise practice of using CIAs instead of the
exclusion remedy, the government has been sharply criticized for targeting
pharmaceutical manufacturers that are marketing their drugs by distributing truthful
scientific and medical information on unapproved uses of the drugs.7 That criticism
is not without merit. Unfortunately, however, that criticism clouds the discussion of
the appropriate remedy when the pharmaceutical manufacturer has engaged in more
egregious illegal marketing practices, such as misrepresenting the safety and
efficacy of an approved drug for an unapproved use or the payment of kickbacks to
health care providers. The problem lies in the fact that the government has
employed a one-size-fits-all approach to illegal promotional practices, without
regard to the seriousness of the offense or the culpability of the offender. Whether
the marketing activities involve truthful or untruthful promotion, the remedy is a
CIA. Whether the pharmaceutical manufacturer is a first time or fifth time offender
of the marketing rules, the remedy is a CIA. With so much emphasis in the
literature on the injustice of prohibiting truthful promotion, there has been a lack of
Promotion (Dec. 21, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/December/
05_civ_685.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Merck to Pay More than $650
Million to Resolve Claims of Fraudulent Price Reporting and Kickbacks (Feb. 7, 2008),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/ February/08_civ_094.html.
7. See, e.g., Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Safety and Commercial Speech: Television
Advertisements and Reprints on Off-Label Uses, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 845 (2010) (arguing
that the Food and Drug Administration cannot lawfully restrict truthful off-label promotion
when those claims are widely accepted and reimbursable under federal health care
programs); Ralph F. Hall & Robert J. Berlin, When You Have a Hammer Everything Looks
Like a Nail: Misapplication of the False Claims Act to Off-Label Promotion, 61 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 653 (2006) (arguing that the False Claims Act should not apply to truthful offlabel promotional activities); Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion:
Balancing Public Health Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225 (2011)
(arguing for the development of a scaled regulation model based on biological principles);
John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You The Truth? A Comparative Perspective on Regulating OffLabel Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 299, 307
(2010) (arguing that “communicating truthful, non-misleading scientific and medical
information supports sound medical practice and should not subject companies to civil or
criminal liability”).
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concern with crafting the best remedy for pharmaceutical manufacturers that violate
the law by blatantly misrepresenting the safety and efficacy of their drugs or
providing illegal kickbacks. Thus, this Article fills an overlooked gap in the
literature by critically examining the use of CIAs to resolve cases where
pharmaceutical manufacturers engage in illegal and untruthful promotional
activities.
This Article argues that neither the exclusion of manufacturers from Medicare
and Medicaid nor the use of CIAs coupled with large fines is an effective deterrent
for pharmaceutical manufacturers that repeatedly engage in illegal marketing
activities to promote their drugs. This Article assesses the alternatives to exclusion
and CIAs and evaluates whether they may be effective remedies for illegal
promotional activities. Part II of this Article surveys the statutory and regulatory
framework for pursuing illegal marketing activities and critically examines the
marketing activities and motives of pharmaceutical manufacturers. Part III
examines deterrence theory and uses Pfizer as a repeat offender case study to
scrutinize the government’s use of CIAs to settle cases involving untruthful
promotional activities. It argues that CIAs fail to deter drug manufacturers from
engaging in illegal promotional practices because the penalty imposed by and the
cost of compliance with the CIA are significantly lower than the profits that a
pharmaceutical company can obtain by illegally marketing its drugs. Further, the
government’s willingness to enter into multiple CIAs with repeat offenders of the
marketing rules rather than exclude them from Medicare and Medicaid
substantially diminishes the ability of CIAs to deter illegal promotional activities.
Part IV argues that there are viable alternatives to be used in place of or in
conjunction with CIAs, such as funding clinical trials, compulsory licensing,
corporate officer liability, and targeted exclusion, that would be more effective
deterrents for repeat offenders. Each of these remedies could be used to increase the
severity of punishment when a one-time offender becomes a repeat offender. This
Article concludes that these proposed measures would be more successful than
CIAs at increasing compliance and enforcing integrity in drug promotion.
I. BACKGROUND
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the introduction of
prescription drugs into commerce.8 Manufacturers that wish to introduce a new

8. Congress established the FDA “to protect consumers from the dangers of fraudulent,
impure, or mislabeled substances.” STEPHEN J. CECCOLI, PILL POLITICS: DRUGS AND THE FDA
3 (2004). In 1938, Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),
which required drug manufacturers to demonstrate that a drug was safe for use before the
manufacturer could sell the drug on the market. Id. In 1962, Congress passed the KefauverHarris Amendments, which required drug manufacturers to demonstrate efficacy as well as
safety for each of a drug’s intended uses. Id. at 77–78. Congress passed the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act,
in 1984. Id. at 129–30. The Hatch-Waxman Act gave the FDA the power to accelerate
approval for new drug applications for generic drugs, thereby reducing the cost of
manufacturing and marketing generic drugs. Id. at 130. It also increased the patent term for
brand-name drugs. Id. at 13. In 1987, Congress passed the Prescription Drug Marketing Act,
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drug into the market must submit a New Drug Application (NDA) along with
scientific evidence that demonstrates the drug’s safety and efficacy for a specified
purpose.9 In turn, the FDA either approves or rejects the particular drug for the
applied-for use. The FDA considers both patient safety and the potential benefit
from the proposed use when approving or rejecting an NDA. At bottom, the FDA
must decide whether the new drug is sufficiently effective for the proposed use
relative to the safety risks of the drug.10 “In other words, the approval standard is
medical benefits versus medical risks.”11 In some cases, the NDA may seek
approval for several uses, but the FDA rejects the drug as unsafe for all but one or
two proposed uses.12 Therefore, a drug may be declared “safe” for marketing for a

which prohibited counterfeit, misbranded, substandard, subpotent, ineffective, or expired
drugs. FDA, REGULATORY INFORMATION, available at http://www.fda.gov/Regulatory
Information/Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosmeticActFDCAct/SignificantAmendmentst
otheFDCAct/PrescriptionDrugMarketingActof1987/default.htm. Finally, in 1997, Congress
passed the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA), which explicitly
permits doctors to prescribe drugs for off-label uses. 21 U.S.C. § 396. At the same time,
however, the FDAMA prohibits drug manufacturers from promoting drugs for off-label uses
unless the manufacturer resubmits the drug to the FDA for testing and approval. CECCOLI,
supra, at 4.
9. Before a pharmaceutical manufacturer can submit an NDA to the FDA, the
manufacturer must put the drug through several phases of testing. CECCOLI, supra note 8, at
165–68.
In the preclinical testing phase, the pharmaceutical laboratory tests the drug
compound using animal and laboratory studies to evaluate the safety, potential toxicity, and
biological activity. Id. Preclinical testing lasts on average from three to four years. Id. After
the pharmaceutical manufacturer has concluded preclinical testing on a new compound, the
manufacturer may file an investigational new drug application with the FDA. Id. The FDA
then has thirty days to reject the application. Id. If the FDA does not reject the application,
the manufacturer may begin testing on humans. Id. In Phase I trials, the compound is tested
on a group of twenty to eighty healthy volunteers. In Phase I, researchers attempt to establish
the safety and toxicity of the compound as well as monitor the drug’s behavior in the body.
Id. The researchers also settle on drug indications and dosage requirements during Phase I.
Researchers ordinarily spend one year on Phase I clinical testing. Id. In Phase II, researchers
conduct controlled studies on 100–300 subjects who are suffering from the disease under
consideration. Id. The researchers assess the effectiveness of the drug and any possible side
effects. Phase II typically takes two years to complete. Id. In Phase III, researchers perform
controlled testing on 1000–3000 patients who, like in Phase II, are afflicted with the disease
under consideration. Id. In this phase, the researchers’ goals are to determine the long-term
effects in the body from drug use and to establish the efficacy of the drug. Id. In addition,
researchers perfect the dosage requirements and monitor long-term side effects and adverse
reactions from the drug. Id. Typically, testing in Phase III takes the form of randomized
double-blind, placebo-controlled clinical investigations where neither the researcher nor the
subject knows where the placebo lies. Id. Generally, Phase III takes three years. Id.
10. Bruce Patsner, Marketing Approval Versus Cost of New Medical Technologies in the
Era of Comparative Effectiveness: CMS, Not FDA, Will Be the Primary Player, 3 J. HEALTH
& LIFE SCI. L. 38, 54 (2010).
11. Id.
12. Joel Lexchin, The Pharmaceutical Industry and the Pursuit of Profit, in THE POWER
OF PILLS: SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN DRUG DEVELOPMENT, MARKETING, AND
PRICING 11, 13 (Jillian Claire Cohen, Patricia Illingworth & Udo Schüklenk eds., 2006).
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specific use, but not safe across the board.13 FDA-approved drugs have a label that
sets forth the approved uses for that product.14 Pharmaceutical companies may only
promote FDA-approved, or “on-label,” uses to prescribers and customers.15 A
pharmaceutical company may not engage in “off-label promotion”—promoting a
drug for a use that is not on-label.
A. Off-Label Use and Promotion
Although pharmaceutical manufacturers may not engage in off-label promotion,
doctors have the discretion to prescribe drugs for off-label uses. A doctor prescribes
a drug off-label whenever the prescription varies in any way from the label.16 Thus,
a doctor may prescribe a drug for a use that is not listed on the label or in a way
that is not listed on the label, such as varying the dosage. Doctors have the
discretion to prescribe drugs off-label when their independent medical judgment
supports the prescription.17 The FDA does not prohibit off-label prescriptions
because they do not want to deny patients medication that may be effective for the
treatment of their medical problems.18 Nor does the FDA want to interfere with
medical innovation or judgment.19 The FDA recognizes that “off-label uses or
treatment regimens may be important and may even constitute a medically
recognized standard of care.”20 Although there are risks to using drugs in ways that
have not been fully vetted by the FDA, there are also many benefits to doing so.
FDA evaluation of NDAs is often a slow process and may not be able to keep pace
with cutting edge medical advances that use FDA-approved drugs for off-label

13. CECCOLI, supra note 8, at 165–68.
14. Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed.
Reg. 64074, 64075 (Dep’t Health & Human Servs. Dec. 3, 1977) (notice).
15. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d) (2006) (describing labeling requirements of new drugs).
16. Id. (explaining that off-label prescriptions include prescribing a drug for a purpose
not designated on the labeling, prescribing to a person in a group other than those for which
the FDA approved the drug, that is prescribing a drug to a child that was approved for an
adult or prescribing for an interval of time that surpasses the time indicated on the label).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006) (explaining that the FDCA does not “limit or interfere with
the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed
device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care practitionerpatient relationship”). Although the government does not place limitations on physicians
prescribing drugs for off-label uses, the government has placed limits on Medicare
reimbursement for drugs that have been prescribed for off-label uses. To be reimbursed for
an off-label use, the off-label use of the drug must be recognized in one or more of several
named compendia. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(t)(2), 1395w-102(e)(1), 1396r-8(k)(6).
18. Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit
of False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61 (2008).
19. Id.
20. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., GOOD
REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR
SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND
APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES 3 (2009) [hereinafter FDA, GOOD REPRINT
PRACTICES], available at www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-2008-D-0053gdl.pdf.
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uses. In addition, some rare medical conditions have no on-label treatments because
the pharmaceutical companies cannot justify the expense of clinical trials for such a
small patient population.21 In particular, oncology and pediatric patients are often
recipients of off-label therapies.22 Further, there is little financial incentive to incur
the cost of a supplemental drug approval process if the drug will soon lose its
patent protection because generic drug manufacturers will enter the market and
compete with the patented drug.
1. The Government’s Interest in Off-Label Promotion
While there are undoubtedly benefits to prescribing drugs for off-label uses, the
FDA does not look favorably upon pharmaceutical manufacturers that promote
their drugs for off-label uses. The Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
and the FDA’s implementing regulations generally prohibit manufacturers of new
drugs from distributing products in interstate commerce for any “intended use” that
the FDA has not approved as safe and effective or, in the case of generic drugs,
cleared through a substantial equivalence determination.23 Drug manufacturers
engage in off-label promotion whenever they “promote or advertise their products
for purposes, to users, in dosages, or in combinations other than the FDA-approved
ones.”24 “Promotion” means all proactive activities (written, oral, or otherwise) that
directly or indirectly market, sell, or support product sales and use, or that
contribute to the sales growth of a company’s products.25 For example, the FDA
views promotion as including written labeling and advertising materials,
interactions with sales representatives, company websites, dissemination of journal
articles, and, in some cases, trade show presentations, physician training, and
reimbursement advice.26 Certain Continuing Medical Education (CME) activities
also can stray into promotional conduct if undertaken for the purpose of inducing
commercial sales. While it is true that many medications have been used offlabel successfully, the FDA rules prohibiting off-label promotion are meant to
serve as an incentive for pharmaceutical manufacturers to conduct the clinical
studies necessary to demonstrate safety and efficacy and ultimately gain FDA
approval.27
In the government’s view, off-label marketing presents a danger to patients’
health because the drugs have not been proven safe for their marketed uses.28 The
drugs have either not been through clinical testing for the unapproved use, or

21. Kesselheim, supra note 7, at 237.
22. See id. at 226–38; Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of
FDA-Approved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV.
181, 193 (1999) (“Pediatric prescriptions are especially likely to be off-label because many
drugs are not tested for use by children.”).
23. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 505(a), 502(o), 501(f)(1)(B),
301(a), 301(d), 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 352(o), 351(f)(1)(B), 331(a), 331(d) (2006).
24. Salbu, supra note 22, at 191.
25. See id.
26. See FDA, GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 20.
27. See Salbu, supra note 22, at 187.
28. Kesselheim, supra note 7, at 239.
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worse, the FDA explicitly rejected the drug as unsafe for the unapproved use based
on clinical testing. Thus, when doctors prescribe drugs to patients for off-label uses,
the patients can potentially suffer severe health problems or even death. Further, if
a drug manufacturer were able to freely engage in off-label marketing, it would
have little to no incentive to study a drug’s uses and obtain definitive data on safety
and efficacy. Instead, the manufacturer would simply find the use for which testing
could be done most cheaply and FDA approval obtained most quickly. The
manufacturer would then go on to market the drug for other applications that have
not been proven safe. This would be an end-run around the FDA’s efficacy
standard.29 More importantly, the public would be denied necessary safety and
efficacy information regarding the drug.
2. Pharmaceutical Companies’ Interest in Off-Label Promotion
Pharmaceutical manufacturers want the largest market possible for their
products because a larger market means more profit. Thus, when developing drugs,
manufacturers focus on finding the next “blockbuster” drug30 that will guarantee
the company at least $1 billion in profits per year.31 In turn, drugs that will not
likely reach blockbuster status are often not developed.32 As a result, the
pharmaceutical companies rely upon a small number of blockbuster drugs to carry
the company.33 Initially, however, the market for the product is largely dependent
on the outcome of clinical research.34 If the clinical research does not support
multiple indications for the drug, the FDA may only approve it for limited uses,
which is a major obstacle to substantial profits.35
The other important variable for a blockbuster drug is price. Pharmaceutical
manufacturers in the United States are not subject to price controls.36 Thus, they are

29. John N. Joseph, David Deaton, Houman Ehsan & Mark A. Bonanno, Enforcement
Related to Off-Label Marketing and Use of Drugs and Devices: Where Have We Been and
Where Are We Going?, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 73, 78 (2009).
30. CECCOLI, supra note 8, at 2 (“Blockbuster drugs are superior selling drugs whose
revenues ensure a continual stream of company profits.”).
31. Paula Tironi, Pharmaceutical Pricing: A Review of Proposals to Improve Access
and Affordability of Prescription Drugs, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 311, 324 (2010).
32. Lexchin, supra note 12, at 12.
33. See, e.g., Gregory J. Glover, Statement on Behalf of Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America Before the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
Justice-Antitrust Division: Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace 6 (Mar. 19, 2002)
[hereinafter Glover Statement], available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020319
gregoryjglover.pdf (“[Manufacturers] must rely upon a handful of flagship products for the
majority of their sales, and the commercial life of a drug – from market launch to patent
expiration – is generally less than seven years. Consequently, even major companies must
develop a block-buster every two to three years, or face massive financial contraction.”).
34. Lexchin, supra note 12, at 13.
35. Id. at 13–14 (explaining that drugs that are not found to be as safe or effective as
other drugs used to treat the same or similar condition would pose a significant financial risk
to the pharmaceutical company and can sometimes lead to biases in the outcome of clinical
trials or failure to publish unfavorable results).
36. Lexchin, supra note 12, at 15 (explaining that the United States is one of the only
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able to set prices for blockbuster drugs higher than they would be in Canada or
Europe.37 When setting the price of drugs, drug manufacturers are concerned with
recouping the cost of research and development as well as generating enough profit
to begin research and development of the next generation of drugs.38 In 2001, drug
manufacturers claimed that the average research and development costs for each
new drug brought to market were $802 million.39 That figure has been widely
disputed, but industry outsiders do not have access to pharmaceutical companies’
records to assess the accuracy of that estimate.
The level of competition in the marketplace also influences the price
considerations. Even if the drug does not have any direct competition at the time
that the manufacturer introduces it, competition is heavily influenced by patent
protection for blockbuster drugs. In most cases, pharmaceutical manufacturers do
not have the entire twenty-year patent life to recoup their research and development
costs before generic competitors enter the market.40 Because manufacturers must
developed countries without price controls and that the pharmaceutical lobby ensured that
the government would not be capable of negotiating price discounts for the new Medicare
drug benefits in 2006).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Cost to Bring New Drug to Market: $802m, HEALTHCARE ECONOMIST (April 29,
2006), http://healthcare-economist.com/2006/04/29/802m/ (citing Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald
W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003)).
40. A pharmaceutical patent lasts for twenty years. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). The
patent holder, however, does not have the full twenty years to enjoy patent protection and
prevent generic manufacturers from entering the market. The patent holder loses a portion of
the patent life while seeking the FDA’s approval of the patented drug. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION 59 (2006). Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, some of the time spent on FDA
approval is reinstated. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355; 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271). One
day of patent life is restored for every two days spent on the clinical study process and for
each day the FDA spent reviewing the NDA. EPSTEIN, supra, at 59–60. The maximum
amount of patent time that may be reinstated is five years. Despite the returned patent period
of up to five years, pharmaceutical patents have useful lives of nine to thirteen years while
other industries enjoy useful patent lives of more than eighteen years. Id. at 60. The HatchWaxman Act also limits the ability of patent holders to prevent generic copies of their drugs
from entering the market. Under the Act, generic manufacturers are permitted to both test
and manufacture their drug during the patent holder’s patent period, which puts the generic
manufacturer in a position to sell the generic equivalent immediately upon patent expiration.
Id. at 60; 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). The Hatch-Waxman Act also simplifies the drug approval
process for generic manufacturers. Generic manufacturers simply have to demonstrate
bioequivalence to gain approval of the generic drug rather than safety and efficacy through
clinical trials. EPSTEIN, supra, at 62. Bioequivalence means that the generic drug “act[s] in
the body in the same way as the original innovator drug.” NIHCM FOUNDATION, A PRIMER:
GENERIC DRUGS, PATENTS, AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETPLACE 4 (2002). To gain
FDA approval, generic manufacturers must prove that the generic has the same active
ingredient, strength, dosage form, and route of administration as the branded drug.
Bioequivalence, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.gphaonline.org/
issues/bioequivalence.
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apply for a patent during the clinical testing stage, there may only be ten years to
recoup their investment rather than twenty years.41 Once a patent expires, the
manufacturer has little incentive to aggressively market the drug, because after
generic manufacturers enter the market, the price of the blockbuster drug will fall
substantially. In addition to competition from generic manufacturers at the end of
the patent life of the blockbuster drug, pharmaceutical manufacturers may also face
competition from other drug makers that introduce drugs to treat the same
disease.42
To maximize profit potential, drug manufacturers must price blockbuster drugs
high and market them aggressively during the patent period. Drug manufacturers
are banned from promoting drugs for off-label uses, but prescribers are not
prohibited from prescribing drugs for off-label uses if, based on their medical
judgment, they believe the drug will be beneficial for the patient. Thus, from a
pharmaceutical company’s perspective, there is a huge market that can be tapped
by convincing prescribers that their drug is beneficial for off-label uses. If a drug
manufacturer wants to exploit the untapped market for a drug, it has two choices.
The drug manufacturer can either apply to the FDA to have an off-label use added
to a drug’s labeling (another costly approval process) or it can circumvent the FDA
and promote the drug to prescribers for off-label uses. Because the pharmaceutical
industry is largely motivated by profit, manufacturers often choose the latter path.
B. Regulatory Environment
When aggressive marketing crosses the line into off-label promotion, there are
numerous federal and state agencies involved in enforcement. Because Corporate
Integrity Agreements (CIAs) are entered into with the federal government, this
Article focuses on the federal agencies charged with regulating the promotional
activities of pharmaceutical companies.
The FDA is responsible for the approval of new drugs and for monitoring the
promotional activities of pharmaceutical manufacturers, but the FDA plays a
relatively small role in enforcement because of the relationship to Medicare and
Medicaid. Medicare is a federally funded insurance program for individuals who
are age sixty-five or older.43 Medicaid is a joint federal‐state program that supports
states’ coverage of medical care and other support services for certain categories of
low‐income individuals.44 The federal government pays a share, known as the

41. EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 59.
42. See, e.g., Glover Statement, supra note 33, at 8 (“[B]reakthrough drugs generally
face competition within their initial patent life from other branded drugs of the same
therapeutic class. This sets up a competitive environment in which branded rivals rely
heavily on product differentiation to achieve competitive advantage over other branded
rivals.”).
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395−1395h; Medicare Program–General Information: Overview,
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/ MedicareGenInfo/
(noting that Medicare provides coverage to those aged sixty-five and older, individuals with
certain disabilities, and individuals with end-stage renal disease).
44. Id.
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Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), of each state’s Medicaid costs.45
Once the FDA has approved a drug, Medicare and Medicaid provide
reimbursements for prescription drug costs. On the federal level, both programs are
run by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Because the
promotion of drugs for off-label uses can lead to off-label prescriptions that are
reimbursed by CMS, the FDA is not the only government agency concerned with
the promotional activities of pharmaceutical manufacturers.
CMS does not cover prescription drug costs for Medicare and Medicaid patients
without regard to whether the FDA has approved the drug, but FDA approval is not
the sole consideration in reimbursement decisions. CMS will pay prescription drug
claims for any on-label use for prescription drugs that have been approved under
the FDCA.46 For off-label prescriptions, however, the reimbursement is contingent
on whether there is a “medically accepted indication” for the drug.47 To constitute a
“medically accepted indication” for the drug, the use of the drug in an off-label
manner must be “included or approved for inclusion” in one of the three endorsed
drug compendia.48 A drug compendium is a complete listing of FDA-approved
drugs and biologics that includes an explanation of how each drug works, proper
dosing, and whether the drug is recommended for treatment for specific diseases.49
Because scientific information may support the use of particular drugs for
indications not approved by the FDA, the compendium may recommend uses that
are not a part of the FDA-approved label for the drug. Thus, if an off-label use is
endorsed in one of the three approved drug compendia, CMS will likely reimburse
for the off-label prescription. CMS also determines the rate of reimbursement for a
particular drug.50 Unlike the FDA’s decision making, which is one of “benefit
versus risk,” CMS’s coverage-for-reimbursement decision “is first one of benefit
per se, and then one of benefit versus cost.”51 If a state makes an improper
Medicaid payment to a health care provider for an off-label use that is not listed in
one of the drug compendia, there will be a corresponding improper federal payment
by CMS because Medicaid is a matching program.52

45. See THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE MEDICAID
PROGRAM AT A GLANCE 2 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7235.cfm.
46. Social Security Act § 1927(k)(2)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–8(k)(2)(A)(i).
47. Social Security Act § 1927(d)(1)(B)(i), (k)(3), (k)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–
8(d)(1)(B)(i), 8(k)(3), 8(k)(6).
48. Id. § 1927(g)(1)(B)(i), (k)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–8(g)(1)(B)(i), (k)(6). The three
approved drug compendia include: (1) the American Hospital Formulary Service Drug
Information; (2) the United States Pharmacopeia-Drug Information; and (3) the DRUGDEX
Information System. Id. § 1927(g)(1)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–8 (g)(1)(B)(i). CMS uses
different compendia to determine a “medically accepted indication” for anti-cancer drugs.
See id. § 1861(t)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(t)(2)(A).
49. Joshua Cohen, Andrew Wilson & Laura Faden, Off-Label Use Reimbursement, 64
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 391, 396 (2009).
50. Patsner, supra note 10, at 55.
51. Id. (“The CMS standard clearly encompasses financial security so that money is not
wasted on expensive medical products with little or no advantage for its beneficiaries over
existing, less expensive ones.”).
52. Bolstering the Safety Net: Eliminating Medicaid Fraud: Hearing Before the Federal
Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security Subcommittee
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Due to the reimbursement issues involving CMS, the Health and Human
Services Office of Inspector General (OIG) is necessarily involved in enforcement.
OIG is responsible for eliminating “waste, abuse, and fraud” in Health and Human
Services (HHS) programs and operations.53 One of OIG’s chief responsibilities is
protecting the integrity of programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. Within OIG,
the Office of Investigations is responsible for performing investigative activities
related to allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in HHS programs
by applicants, grantees, contractors, or by HHS employees in the performance of
their official duties.54 In addition, the Office of Investigations serves as the liaison
to the Department of Justice (DOJ) on all matters relating to investigations of HHS
programs when OIG has reasonable grounds to believe federal criminal law has
been violated.55 OIG also serves as the liaison with CMS and investigates Medicare
and Medicaid fraud by pharmaceutical companies.56 Further, OIG serves as the
liaison with state licensing boards with regard to exclusion, compliance, and
enforcement activities.57 OIG also administers CIAs and enforces permissive and
mandatory exclusions imposed through liaison with CMS, the DOJ, and other
governmental and private sector entities.58 Finally, OIG provides industry guidance
on compliance with the federal health care laws.59
The DOJ is also heavily involved in health care fraud and abuse cases because it
has joint responsibility with OIG for pharmaceutical promotional fraud and abuse
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).60
There are several ways that the DOJ can become involved in a pharmaceutical
marketing fraud case. First, the FDA may refer a case that involves the FDCA to
the Consumer Protection Branch of the Civil Division.61 The FDCA prohibits the
of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 10 (2006)
(testimony of Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services). It should be noted that detection of off-label uses has been a problem because
prior authorization is not needed before most pharmaceuticals are dispensed. In those
situations, it is difficult to ascertain whether the drugs are being prescribed for off-label uses.
Audits are often utilized to determine off-label use. See Cohen et al., supra note 49, at 395.
53. Organizational Structure, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.hhsc.state.tx.us/
AboutOIG/OrgStructure.aspx.
54. Office of Inspector General, Statement of Organization, Functions and Delegations
of Authority, 69 Fed. Reg. 40,390 (Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. July 2, 2004) (notice).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 40,391.
59. Christopher D. Zalesky, Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices: Balancing Public
Health and Law Enforcement Interests; Moving Beyond Regulation-Through-Litigation, 39
J. HEALTH L. 235, 247 (2006).
60. P.L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2006)). HIPAA created
the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program, an expansive program to address fraud
and abuse in health care, including both public and private health plans. This program is
under the joint direction of the Secretary of HHS and the attorney general. It is designed to
coordinate federal, state, and local law enforcement activities with respect to health care
fraud and abuse. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c(a)(1).
61. See U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL 4-8.205 (2011). The DOJ’s Consumer Protection
Division of the Civil Branch was formerly known as the Office of Consumer Litigation. Id.
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introduction of any misbranded drug into interstate commerce.62 A drug is
misbranded when its label is false or misleading or when it has inadequate
directions for use.63 All intended uses must have adequate directions for their use,
but the drug label may only contain information on approved uses. Therefore, the
government’s theory under the FDCA when pursuing off-label promotion is that
the manufacturer has provided inadequate directions for the intended off-label use
of the drug. Because the drug has not been shown to be safe and effective for the
off-label use, a drug promoted for uses that are not listed on the label, by definition,
must be misbranded because there are no directions for the use.64 Alternatively, the
government may pursue a pharmaceutical manufacturer for a misbranding violation
under the theory that by promoting the drug for off-label uses, the pharmaceutical
manufacturer has introduced an unapproved new drug into the market. An FDAapproved drug can be considered a new drug if it is promoted for unapproved
uses.65 Therefore, promoting an existing drug for a new use is tantamount to
introducing an unapproved new drug into interstate commerce.
Second, the DOJ may get involved due to a civil False Claims Act (FCA) case
brought by a whistleblower. The FCA makes it unlawful to knowingly present, or
cause to be presented, false or fraudulent claims paid by the government.66 The
FCA allows private citizens, known as “relators,” to bring qui tam suits in the name
of the government, based on the individual’s knowledge of fraud against the
government.67 Whistleblowers are incentivized to bring suits because they are
at 4-8.010.
62. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a).
63. Id. § 352(a), (f). “Adequate directions for use” means that the directions are
sufficiently clear that a layperson could use a drug safely and effectively for the intended
use. 21 C.F.R § 201.5 (2010).
64. 21 C.F.R. § 201.100.
65. Id. § 310.3(h)(4)–(5). The newness of a drug may arise due to its use in treating a
condition “even though such drug is not a new drug when used in another disease . . . .” Id. §
310.3(h)(4). Further, the newness of a drug may be shown by using an approved drug in a
dosage that differs from the label “even though such drug when used in other dosage . . . is
not a new drug.” Id.§ 310.3(h)(5).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 287.
67. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). To discourage opportunistic relators, the FCA prevents
relators from bringing a claim based on publicly disclosed information. JENNIFER STAMAN,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22743, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE LAWS AFFECTING
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID: AN OVERVIEW 10–12 (2010), http://aging.senate.gov/
crs/medicaid20.pdf. Thus, if there was a public disclosure of information in:
(1) a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, (2) in a congressional,
administrative, or Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, hearing,
audit, or investigation, or (3) from the news media, unless the action is brought
by the Attorney General or the relator bringing the action is an “original
source” of the information. A relator was defined as an original source if the
relator had direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the
allegations of the FCA claim are based and had voluntarily provided the
information to the government before filing an action.
Id. at 9 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B)). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (PPACA) loosens some of these requirements. Under the PPACA, the government is
given discretion to determine whether to allow a qui tam suit to go forward despite the fact
that the information was publicly disclosed. Id. Further, PPACA makes the public disclosure
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entitled to a portion of the recovery if the suit is successful. Relators file suit under
the FCA for fraud resulting from off-label promotion due to the negative effects it
has on state and federally funded programs such as Medicaid, which may prohibit
reimbursement for off-label prescriptions. The suit is filed under seal and the
government has sixty days to determine whether to take over the case as its own or
to leave the case to the relator to litigate.68 If the DOJ decides to take over the qui
tam case, it may serve a civil investigative demand (CID) to obtain documentary
evidence “for the purpose of ascertaining whether any person is or has been
engaged in” a violation of the FCA.69
The theory of liability under the FCA is that a manufacturer is liable if it
knowingly engages in a promotional program that induces third parties to file
Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement claims for off-label uses that were not
eligible for reimbursement.70 The difficulty is that even though the federal
government pays for drugs provided to Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries, the
pharmaceutical manufacturers do not bill the federal government directly for their
drugs. Thus, the government could not use the normal theory of liability under the
FCA—that the pharmaceutical manufacturer submitted a claim to the government
for payment of prescriptions that are not reimbursable under Medicare and
Medicaid. Because submitting a claim to the government is the touchstone theory
of liability under the FCA, the government needed to create the innovative theory
concerning inducement to file a claim. This theory has not been tested in court.
Indeed, it would be difficult to prove that a particular reimbursement claim is due
to off-label promotion as opposed to the doctor’s professional judgment. The
government has used the theory to leverage huge settlements with pharmaceutical
manufacturers, however, because the manufacturers could not risk testing the
government’s theory in court.
In May 2009, Congress simplified the theory of recovery under the FCA when it
enacted the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA).71 Under FERA,
it is no longer a requirement that a false claim be submitted to the government.
Instead, if the false claim is paid out of government funds or with funds that are
“spent or used on the Government’s behalf or to advance a Government program or
interest,” liability will attach.72 Thus, the theory of liability under the FCA is much
more straightforward after FERA. If Medicare and Medicaid reimburse a

bar applicable only if the information was obtained from federal government or media
sources. It does not apply if the information was learned from a state source. Id. at 10.
Finally, the PPACA alters the definition of original source.
Under PPACA, an original source is one who (1) has voluntarily disclosed to
the government the information on which allegations or transactions in a claim
are based, or (2) has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to
the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has voluntarily
provided the information to the government before filing an action.
Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B)).
68. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
69. Id. §§ 3733(a)(I), 3733(l)(2). The CID may include document requests, written
interrogatories, and depositions. Id.
70. Osborn, supra note 7, at 329.
71. S. 386, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted).
72. Id.
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pharmaceutical manufacturer’s products, any violation of the FDCA, such as offlabel promotion, is actionable under the FCA.
Third, OIG may refer a case to the DOJ because they have a reasonable belief
that federal criminal law, such as the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), has been
violated. The AKS makes it unlawful to: (1) knowingly and willfully; (2) offer or
pay, solicit or receive; (3) any remuneration;73 (4) to induce the referral of an
individual to another person or entity for the “furnishing of any item or service”; or
to induce the purchasing or ordering of such item or service; (5) payable “in whole
or in part” by a federal health care program.74 Prior to the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA),75 there was a circuit split on whether the mens rea
requirement of “knowingly and willfully” required a specific intent to violate the
AKS.76 The specific intent requirement that some courts imposed made it more
difficult to obtain a conviction because defendants could assert that they did not
know that their conduct violated the AKS. The PPACA resolved the circuit split,
stating: “a defendant does not have to have actual knowledge of, or specific intent
to commit a violation of, the anti-kickback statute.”77 Criminal conviction under the
AKS leads to a fine of up to $25,000, up to five years imprisonment, and
mandatory exclusion from participation in Medicare and Medicaid for up to one
year.78
In addition to being a source for criminal charges, violations of the AKS are
often used as the basis for civil actions against pharmaceutical companies under the
FCA.79 If a person or entity is involved in a kickback scheme involving Medicare
or Medicaid, that person or entity may face civil liability under the FCA if the
person knowingly submits, or causes a third party to submit, false or fraudulent
claims for goods or services tainted by kickbacks.80 Prior to the enactment of the
PPACA, relators attempting to hold pharmaceutical manufacturers liable under the
FCA for violations of the AKS had to prove that the claims submitted were false.81
It was difficult for relators to prove falsity because even though the AKS may have
been violated, the prices for the drugs that were submitted for reimbursement were
correct.82 Thus, relators alleged that the claim was legally false because the entity
or person submitting the claim falsely certified compliance with the AKS.83 An

73. “Remuneration” does not include a discount or other reduction in price obtained by
a provider of services or other entity if the reduction in price is properly disclosed and
reflected in the costs claimed or charges made by the provider or entity under a federal
health care program. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(b)(3).
74. Id. § 1320a–7b(b)(2).
75. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 121 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 21,
25, 26, 29 & 42 U.S.C.).
76. STAMAN, supra note 67, at 4 (citing Hanlester Network v. Shalala 51 F.3d 1390,
1399–1400 (9th Cir. 1995) and United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 1998)).
77. Id. at 4–5; Pub. L. No. 111-148, §6402(f)(2), 124 Stat. 121, 759 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(h)).
78. STAMAN, supra note 67, at 2.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 8 n.43.
81. Rost v. Pfizer Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 367, 375–378 (D. Mass. 2010).
82. Id. at 376.
83. “False certification can be express, where the claim is accompanied by an explicit
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example may be helpful here. Assume that a pharmaceutical manufacturer has paid
doctors to prescribe its drugs in violation of the AKS. The doctor prescribes the
manufacturer’s drugs to a Medicare or Medicaid patient who then goes to the
pharmacy to fill the prescription. After filling the prescription, the pharmacy
submits a claim for reimbursement to Medicare or Medicaid. The claim, the theory
goes, is tainted by the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s kickback and should be
considered false. Again, a pharmaceutical manufacturer does not directly submit
claims to the government for reimbursement. Therefore, this tainted claim theory
under the AKS ran into the most difficulty when the claims were not submitted by a
participant in the kickback scheme. In other words, when the claim was submitted
by innocent third parties, such as pharmacies, that: (1) were unaware of the
kickbacks, (2) only certified their own compliance with the AKS, or (3) did not
expressly certify compliance with the AKS,84 the government could not
demonstrate falsity under the FCA.
The PPACA does away with the falsity requirement for claims submitted by an
innocent third party. The amendment to the AKS states that “a claim that includes
items or services resulting from a violation of this section constitutes a false or
fraudulent claim for the purposes of [the FCA].”85 It does not matter whether the
doctor who was part of the kickback scheme submits the tainted claim or an
innocent third party submits the claim. Thus, relators no longer need to claim that
the innocent third party expressly or impliedly certified compliance with the AKS
to prove that there was a false claim under the FCA. Thus, the PPACA removed a
major hurdle to holding pharmaceutical manufacturers liable under the FCA for
claims tainted by the AKS.
In sum, the FDA, OIG, and the DOJ work collectively to enforce the federal
health care fraud laws against pharmaceutical manufacturers. Most cases will
involve misbranding violations, kickbacks, or false claims. Pharmaceutical
manufacturers’ potential liability for illegal marketing practices has increased in the
last few years through amendments to the FCA by FERA and the PPACA. Further,
the PPACA makes it easier to bring cases against pharmaceutical manufacturers
involving kickbacks and false claims.
C. Exclusion
The Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary of HHS (and, through a
delegation of authority, OIG) to exclude individuals and entities that have engaged
in fraud or abuse from participation in federal health care programs, such as
Medicare and Medicaid.86 OIG sets its own policies with respect to its exclusion
authority: “Exclusion means that items and services furnished, ordered or
prescribed by a specified individual or entity will not be reimbursed under
statement of compliance, or implied, where the act of submitting the claim implies
compliance.” Id. at 375.
84. See, e.g., id. at 367–78 (finding that these types of claims are not false under the
FCA).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(b)(2) (2006).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2011). The statutory term “participation” refers to individuals
and entities that have entered into an agreement with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services to bill and receive program payment for services furnished to beneficiaries. Id.
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Medicare, Medicaid and all other federal health care programs until the individual
or entity is reinstated by OIG.”87 Exclusion for a period of five years is mandatory
following a criminal conviction, and is permissive when a provider engages in less
serious infractions.88 The effect of exclusion is that no federal health care program
payment may be made for any items or services either (1) “furnished” by an
excluded individual or entity or (2) directed or prescribed by an excluded
physician.89
In 1992, OIG stated that it would only apply its exclusion authority against
participating providers who receive payment directly from the program, such as
physicians and hospitals.90 Thus, OIG did not assert exclusion authority over
indirect providers, such as pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, because
they did not receive Medicare and Medicaid payments directly.91 In 1997, however,
OIG changed course and expanded its exclusion authority to include indirect
providers such as pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies.92 Under the new
rule, the effect of exclusion of a pharmaceutical manufacturer is that “no payment
would be made to any direct provider for items and services manufactured,
distributed or otherwise provided” by the excluded pharmaceutical manufacturer.93
OIG must follow a standard procedure to exercise its exclusion authority against
a pharmaceutical company or any other entity. When OIG wants to exclude an
entity, it sends a notice of intent to exclude.94 The entity has thirty days to submit a

87. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
88. STAMAN, supra note 67, at 2–3 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b)) (“Exclusion is
mandatory for those convicted of certain offenses, including (1) a criminal offense related to
the delivery of an item or service under Medicare, Medicaid, or a state health care program;
(2) a criminal offense relating to neglect or abuse of patients in connection with the delivery
of a health care item or service; or (3) a felony relating to the unlawful manufacture,
distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a controlled substance. OIG has ‘permissive’
authority to exclude an entity or an individual from a federal health program under numerous
circumstances, including conviction of certain misdemeanors relating to fraud, theft,
embezzlement, breach of fiduciary duty or other financial misconduct; a conviction based on
an interference with or obstruction of an investigation into a criminal offense; and revocation
or suspension of a health care practitioner’s license for reasons bearing on the individual’s or
entity’s professional competence, professional performance, or financial integrity.”).
89. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.1901.
90. Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Amendments to OIG Exclusion and CMP
Authorities Resulting from Public Law 100-93, 57 Fed. Reg. 3298, 3300 (Jan. 29, 1992) (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001–06).
91. Id. (explaining that although OIG has the authority to do so, they choose not to
include entities that furnish items covered by Medicare but that do not receive program
payments directly due to the difficulty of administering the exclusions).
92. 42 C.F.R. §1000.10 (2003) (“Furnished refers to items or services provided or
supplied, directly or indirectly, by any individual or entity. This includes items and services
manufactured, distributed or otherwise provided by individuals or entities that do not directly
submit claims to Medicare, Medicaid or other Federal health care programs, but that supply
items or services to providers, practitioners or suppliers who submit claims to these
programs for such items or services.” (emphasis in original)).
93. Id.
94. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2001 (2011).
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written response.95 If OIG reviews the entity’s response and decides to exclude, it
issues a notice of exclusion to the entity.96 Upon exclusion, the entity has the right
to an appeal before an administrative law judge (ALJ).97 Following the ALJ’s
decision, the entity has thirty days to appeal the decision to the Departmental
Appeals Board.98 The Departmental Appeals Board’s decision is considered final
and may be appealed in federal court.99
D. Corporate Integrity Agreements
Despite the fact that exclusion is available as a remedy, it is hardly, if ever,
invoked against a pharmaceutical manufacturer. Instead, the government uses the
threat of exclusion to convince manufacturers to enter into CIAs and enact farreaching corporate reforms. CIAs are administrative settlements negotiated with
OIG that require organizations to undertake compliance and integrity obligations
for a term of three to five years.100 Organizations enter into CIAs to settle alleged
violations of federal health care program requirements such as off-label promotion
of drugs, kickbacks, or overbilling of Medicare and Medicaid for health services.101
In most situations, the CIA is one part of a global settlement that involves the DOJ,
the FDA, civil litigants, and the states.102 The organization pays a large fine and, in
return, OIG agrees not to pursue exclusion of the organization from Medicare and
Medicaid. OIG has entered into hundreds of CIAs in the past ten years.103 At the
beginning of most CIAs, there is a statement that the company entering into the
agreement has a compliance program in place.104 Next, the CIA will address the

95. Id.
96. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001.2002, 2003 (explaining the notice requirements).
97. Id. § 1001.2001;§ 1005.2.
98. Id. § 1005.21.
99. See id.
100. Scott A. Memmott & Betsy McCubrey, Recent Trends Involving CIAs Significantly
Raise Stakes for Health Care Industry Participants, 11 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 51, 55
n.1 (2009).
101. Id.
102. For example, in 2009 Pfizer entered into a CIA and a settlement agreement with the
DOJ, the TRICARE Management Activity, and the relators in the civil FCA case. See
CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND PFIZER INC. (Aug. 31, 2009)
[hereinafter CIA PFIZER 2009], available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/
pfizer_inc_08312009.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/Press Office - Press Release Files/Pfizer/Pfizer
Settlement Agreement.pdf.
103. For a complete list of CIAs, see Corporate Integrity Agreement Documents, OFF.
INSPECTOR GEN. (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/cia_list.asp (listing and
providing CIAs beginning in 2003). Many of these CIAs involve named individuals, such as
doctors, or health care providers, such as hospitals, but the focus here is on CIAs involving
pharmaceutical manufacturers. See also Ralph F. Hall, Corporate Integrity Agreements, in
PUNISHING CORPORATE CRIME: LEGAL PENALTIES FOR CRIMINAL AND REGULATORY
VIOLATIONS 97, 99 (James T. O’Reilly et al. eds., 2009).
104. See Hall, supra note 103, at 100.
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scope of the agreement which ordinarily involves: (1) whether the whole company
has obligations under the agreement or only certain subsidiaries or divisions; (2)
the responsibilities of the individuals within the company; and (3) the kind of
business endeavors that are covered.105 With each of these, the government wants
the scope to be as broad as possible, and the company wants it to be narrow to save
the expense of compliance and the risk of future violations.106
Once the term and scope of the agreement have been set forth, the CIA will
address the “Corporate Integrity Obligations” that the organization must meet. It is
standard for the CIA to require the creation of a compliance committee and the
selection of a compliance officer who is a part of senior management and has
immediate contact with the board of directors.107 The organization is required to
inform OIG if it changes the compliance officer.108 In some cases, OIG may dictate
to whom the compliance officer should or should not report within the
organization.109 OIG may also specify the members of the compliance committee
and the information flow between the compliance committee and other business
units within the organization.110 In recent years, OIG has also required the board of
directors to take an active role in supervising the compliance program and make
certifications regarding its effectiveness.111
As the use of CIAs has increased, so too has OIG’s level of sophistication in
crafting the Corporate Integrity Obligations. Before 2008, most CIAs required
corporate compliance officers to make certifications regarding the effectiveness of
the company’s compliance program.112 Beginning with Cephalon, Inc.’s September

105. Id. at 100–01. In particular, questions of scope often involve questions about
whether the entire company, only certain business units, or a subsidiary of the company will
be governed by the agreement. Id. at 101.
106. Id. at 101–02.
107. Id. at 102.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 102–03.
111. Id. at 103. Some recent agreements include language specifying that the board is
“responsible for the review and oversight of matters related to compliance” and specifying
quarterly meetings to review the performance of the compliance officer and department. Id.
(quoting CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND ELI LILLY AND
COMPANY 5 (Jan. 14, 2009) [hereinafter CIA ELI LILLY], available at
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/eli_lilly_and_company_01142009.pdf).
Further, some CIAs now require the board of directors to adopt “a resolution . . .
summarizing its review and oversight of [the company’s] compliance with federal health
care program requirements, FDA requirements, and the obligations of this CIA. Each
individual member of the Board . . . shall sign a statement indicating that he or she agrees
with the resolution.” Id. (quoting CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND
CEPHALON, INC. (Sept. 29, 2008) [hereinafter CIA CEPHALON], available at
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/cephalon.pdf). The organization must keep
OIG abreast of any changes to the composition of the board. Id.
112. See Memmott & McCubrey, supra note 100, at 53 (explaining that compliance
officers had to certify, inter alia, that training had been completed, that policies had been
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2008 CIA, however, OIG began requiring certifications from executives and upper
management.113 The new requirements, entitled “Management Accountability and
Certifications,” generally require the “certifying employee” to sign a certification
stating that: (1) the individual has received training and comprehends the
compliance requirements and responsibilities for the individual’s department; (2)
the individual’s job responsibilities include ensuring compliance for the
individual’s department; and (3) the department is “in compliance with all
applicable federal health care program requirements, FDA requirements and the
obligations of the CIA.”114 These new certification requirements raise the stakes for
management in the event of noncompliance because the certifying individuals may
be subject to personal liability.115
In addition to certification requirements, the CIAs require the organization to
implement codes of conduct that set forth the compliance rules and obligations,
anonymous reporting systems, and a nonretaliation policy.116 Further, CIAs
typically require training on the obligations within the CIAs and the company’s
compliance program.117 Another common provision of CIAs is the company’s
obligation to hire an Independent Review Organization (IRO) to audit systems and
transactions within the organization.118 The IRO typically has a limited focus on
particular compliance obligations.119 CIAs also mandate a toll-free hotline system
that allows individuals to anonymously disclose noncompliance directly to the
compliance office.120 The organizations must follow up and investigate all reports
of noncompliance.121 There are also substantial reporting requirements for
allegations of misconduct.122 Further, CIAs require periodic or annual reports to
OIG, and OIG retains the right to review the organization’s documents to ensure
reviewed and updated, and that the company is in compliance with all federal health care
program requirements).
113. Id. Specifically, CIAs may now require certifications from the chairman, president,
chief executive officer, executive vice presidents, senior vice presidents, executive directors,
business unit sales and marketing vice presidents, chief marketing and operations officer,
chief medical officers, business unit sales directors, medical directors of communications
and medical science liaisons, national and executive sales directors, brand leaders, and
directors of business units of the parent corporation or any affiliate that performs pricing,
sales, marketing, contracting, promotion, medical affairs, or medical information functions.
Id.
114. See Hall, supra note 103, at 104 (quoting CIA ELI LILLY, supra note 111); see also
Memmott & McCubrey, supra note 100, at 53.
115. Hall, supra note 103, at 104.
116. Id. at 105; see also CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND PFIZER INC.
(May 11, 2004) [hereinafter CIA PFIZER 2004] (on file with author).
117. Hall, supra note 103, at 105–06.
118. Id. at 106–07; see CIA PFIZER 2009, supra note 102, at app. B at 1 (“Pfizer shall
retain an Independent Review Organization (IRO) to perform reviews to assist Pfizer in
assessing and evaluating its systems, processes, policies, procedures, and practices related to
Pfizer’s Promotional and Product Related Functions.”).
119. Hall, supra note 103, at 107.
120. Id. at 107.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 108.
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compliance with the CIA.123 Finally, CIAs specify the terms under which a breach
of the agreement will be found and the consequences for that breach. A breach of
the CIA can lead to substantial penalties, or, if there is a “material breach,” OIG
can pursue exclusion of the company from Medicare and Medicaid.124
II. CIAS AND DETERRENCE
OIG has entered into CIAs in lieu of pursuing drug manufacturers civilly or
criminally for health care fraud, which would lead to either permissive or
mandatory exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid. The main goals of the CIA
appear to be reform and rehabilitation. This Part will examine the costs and benefits
of CIAs and whether CIAs are an effective deterrent for off-label promotional
activities. This Part concludes that CIAs are ineffective deterrents for repeat
offenders of the promotional laws.
A. The Use of CIAs Instead of Exclusion Authority
1. The Cost-Benefit Analysis of CIAs
CIAs are beneficial to the manufacturer, the government, and the public at large.
Because of the CIA, the pharmaceutical manufacturer is able to avoid being
excluded from federal health care programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.
Medicare and Medicaid revenue brings in millions, or in some cases, billions, of
dollars of revenue for pharmaceutical manufacturers every year.125 If all of the
drugs from a particular manufacturer were excluded from Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement, the manufacturer would be in danger of collapse, which would lead
to negative externalities for the employees and patients. The company would lose
revenue, and employees would lose their jobs. In addition, the patients would be
greatly harmed. Elderly and poor patients would no longer be able to obtain their
prescriptions through Medicare and Medicaid. They would have to either pay for
the medications themselves or switch to medications produced by a non-excluded
pharmaceutical manufacturer. But it is not always the case that there would be a
substitutable drug available from another manufacturer. Thus, pharmaceutical
companies benefit from the CIA because they are able to avoid these negative
consequences. In turn, patients benefit from CIAs because they do not incur the
negative externalities that would result from exclusion. Patients are able to continue
their treatment without any interruption in benefits because the manufacturer
entered into a CIA.
Finally, the government benefits from entering into a CIA because CIAs allow
the government to save the expense of trial, collect a large settlement, gain

123. Id. at 110.
124. Id. at 111.
125. See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/
NationalHealthExpendData/02_NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.asp#TopOfPage (follow
“National Health Expenditures by Type of Service and Source of Funds: Calendar Year
1960–2010” hyperlink).
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sweeping reforms, and appear to be tough on health care fraud.126 Health care fraud
cases, particularly those based on off-label marketing, take years to investigate. In
addition, the cases are challenging, multifaceted, and expensive to prosecute.127
Pharmaceutical companies have a wealth of resources and will mount a vigorous
defense to any charges of wrongdoing.128 By settling, the government saves
substantial resources that would otherwise be expended to take the case to trial and
also avoids the risk that some of their fraud theories may not stand up in court. The
government also benefits from settlement because the threat of exclusion assists the
government in obtaining huge settlements from drug manufacturers. Further, the
money that the government obtains goes straight into the federal treasury, which
benefits the public. Inevitably, the settlement includes reforms agreed to by the
manufacturer that greatly benefit the public. The government sends out press
releases touting the huge settlements and reform concessions that they obtained
from pharmaceutical manufacturers, which makes them appear tough on health care
fraud. The government appears even tougher when they are able to assert that as
part of the settlement, a subsidiary of the drug manufacturer pled guilty to a felony
in federal court or the manufacturer itself pled guilty to a misdemeanor in federal
court. A guilty plea by a subsidiary, however, is often a sham because the
manufacturer is able to transfer assets and operations from the subsidiary to the
parent company prior to the exclusion. As a result, the exclusion of the subsidiary
does not impact the parent company. Similarly, a plea of guilty to misdemeanor
charges does not lead to exclusion of the manufacturer.
Despite the benefits of the CIA, the costs are substantial. The government bears
very little of the cost, because the majority of the costs of compliance are paid by
the drug manufacturer.129 The drug manufacturer must pay the fine, which may
range from hundreds of millions of dollars to several billion dollars plus additional
costs that spring from the implementation of the CIA.130 The costs associated with

126. See Eli Lilly and Company to Pay U.S. $36 Million Relating to Off-Label
Promotion, supra note 6; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pharmaceutical Company
AztraZeneca to Pay $520 Million for Off-Label Drug Marketing (Apr. 27, 2010), available
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/Pharma-Device/astrazeneca_release.pdf; Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve Criminal & Civil
Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May 13, 2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm.
127. Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New
Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1721 (2007) (explaining the incentives that the
government has to settle corporate crime cases).
128. Id.
129. Kathleen M. Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitoring” Corporate
Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Health Care, 35 AM. J.L. &
MED. 89, 100 (2009).
130. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Allergan Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay
$600 Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Botox® (Sept. 1, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-civ-988.html; Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement
in its History (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/September/
09-civ-900.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation
to Pay $422.5 Million for Off-Label Drug Marketing (Sept. 30, 2010), available at
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the CIA may include: hiring an independent review organization (IRO); changes to
the corporate compliance program; changes to the corporate structure in the area of
corporate compliance and legal counsel; and training programs.131 Nevertheless, it
is in the best interests of the manufacturer to enter into a CIA no matter how
onerous the terms because the company must consider the potential loss of revenue
from Medicare and Medicaid. The manufacturer simply cannot risk the loss of
revenue and damage to the company that would result from exclusion from
Medicare and Medicaid. Thus, for the manufacturer, the government, and the
public, the benefits of CIAs far outweigh the costs.
2. The Repeated Use of CIAs: The Case of Pfizer
Although government investigations into health care fraud pose substantial risks
for pharmaceutical manufacturers, manufacturers realize that the government is not
going to pursue them in court and seek exclusion because of the substantial harm to
patients. At most, the government will require the pharmaceutical manufacturers to
enter into new CIAs. The problem is the moral hazard that this enforcement reality
creates. Even when a pharmaceutical manufacturer that is already under a CIA
engages in off-label promotion of drugs, the government simply waives the
manufacturer’s liability for violating the existing CIA, imposes an even larger fine,
and enters into a new CIA.132 Thus, there is little incentive for the manufacturer to
cease the wrongful conduct as long as the profits from off-label promotion greatly
exceed the fines.
The Pfizer story illustrates the issues surrounding the use of successive CIAs.
Pfizer acquired Warner-Lambert in 2000.133 At the time of the acquisition, WarnerLambert was under investigation by the government for off-label marketing of the
drug Neurontin and had been sued civilly under the FCA.134 In its promotion of
Neurontin, Warner-Lambert promoted the drug for uses for which it was not
approved, paid doctors to induce them to promote and prescribe Neurontin for offlabel uses, and made false statements regarding the uses for which the FDA
approved Neurontin.135 In 2004, OIG settled with Pfizer for $430 million plus
interest and entered into a CIA whereby OIG agreed not to pursue exclusion from
Medicare and Medicaid for Pfizer.136 In addition, Warner-Lambert pled guilty to
violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 331(d), 333(a), 352(f)(1), and 355.137 Because

http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/Pharma-Device/novartis_release.pdf.
131. See Boozang & Handler-Hutchinson, supra note 129, at 100–01.
132. See Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a
Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1095, 1168 n.344 (2006).
133. See Matthew Herper, Pfizer’s Warner-Lambert Acquisition Has Side Effects,
FORBES.COM (June 21, 2000, 2:55 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2000/06/21/mu5.html.
134. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass. 2001).
135. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE 3–4 (May 13, 2004) (on file with author).
136. See id. at 5–10; Press Release, Office of Inspector General, OIG Report Highlights
Progress Against Waste, Abuse, and Fraud (Dec. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/press/2004/120904Release.pdf
137. Letter from Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney for the District of
Massachusetts, to Robert B. Fiske, Jr., Attorney for Warner-Lambert Company, LLC (May
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Pfizer had acquired Warner-Lambert, however, the guilty plea did not lead to
Pfizer’s exclusion from participation in Medicare and Medicaid.138
The 2004 Pfizer CIA had many of the standard provisions, including, inter alia,
Pfizer’s agreement to institute voluntary compliance measures such as appointing a
compliance officer and committee, mandatory training regarding Pfizer’s code of
conduct, and reporting obligations.139 The CIA required that both the compliance
officer and the deputy compliance officers be members of senior management who
make reports directly to the board of directors.140 It further required Pfizer to have
written policies and procedures regarding compliance with FDA and federal health
care program requirements. Specifically, it required Pfizer to create, inter alia, a
policy that conformed to the FDA’s requirements regarding: (1) the method of
selling and marketing information concerning off-label uses of Pfizer’s products;
(2) disclosure of financial support of Continuing Medical Education (CME)
programs; (3) sponsorship of grants; and (4) sponsorship or funding of research
such as clinical trials.141 The CIA also specified that training should include “all
applicable Federal health care program requirements” such as the False Claims Act
and the federal Anti-Kickback Statute.142 Finally, Pfizer was required to retain an
Independent Review Organization to “assist Pfizer in assessing and evaluating its
systems, processes, policies and practices related to . . . Promotional and Product
Services Related Functions.”143
At the time that Pfizer entered into the CIA with OIG and promised not to
engage in illegal marketing activities, Pfizer was actively engaged in an extensive
campaign to market its drug Bextra for off-label uses. Pfizer did not cease its offlabel promotion of Bextra as a result of the 2004 CIA, nor was the illegal
promotion discovered by the new compliance program. Bextra is a painkiller
known as a Cox-2 inhibitor144 that Pharmacia & Upjohn Company, Inc.

13, 2004) (on file with author).
138. For a detailed discussion of the Neurontin case, see Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting
Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label
Prescribing, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 115 n.224 (2008).
139. CIA PFIZER 2004, supra note 116, at 5, 12.
140. Id. at 6.
141. Id. at 8–10.
142. Id. at 12.
143. Id. at 14.
144. The Cox-2 class of drugs was specially designed painkillers that relieved
inflammation and pain similar to other painkillers, but without the gastrointestinal side
effects that other painkillers caused. Information at ¶ 12 United States v. Pharmacia &
Upjohn Company, Inc. (D. Mass. Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/
usao/ma/news/Pfizer/Information.pdf. As part of the agreement between the DOJ and Pfizer,
Pharmacia & Upjohn Company pled guilty to the August 31, 2009 Information, and the
government declined prosecution of Pfizer. Under the agreement, “Pharmacia expressly and
unequivocally admits that it knowingly, intentionally and willfully committed the crime
charged in the attached Information and is in fact guilty of the offense . . . .” Letter from
Michael K. Loucks, Acting United States Attorney District of Massachusetts, to Brien T.
O’Connor (Aug. 31, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/
Pfizer/Side%20Letter%20Agreement.pdf. Thus, all allegations in the Information are taken
as true for the purposes of this Article.
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(“Pharmacia”) introduced into the market in February 2002.145 Pfizer acquired
Pharmacia in April 2003, but jointly promoted the drug Bextra with Pharmacia
prior to the acquisition.146 Pharmacia’s New Drug Application (NDA) for Bextra
sought approval to promote Bextra for the prevention and treatment of acute pain in
adults. The Bextra NDA claimed that administering Bextra prior to surgery would
reduce postsurgical pain.147 In addition, Pharmacia sought approval of Bextra for
the treatment of primary dysmenorrheal (painful menstrual cramps), osteoarthritis,
and adult rheumatoid arthritis.148 On November 16, 2001, the FDA approved
Bextra for the treatment of primary dysmenorrheal, adult rheumatoid arthritis, and
osteoarthritis.149 The FDA did not approve Bextra for postsurgical pain due to
safety concerns.150
Pharmacia’s marketing team promoted Bextra for acute pain, including surgical
pain, even though the FDA did not approve Bextra for those uses.151 The marketing
team created materials that directed Pharmacia’s sales force to aggressively pursue
written surgical and pain management standing orders for Bextra for both approved
and unapproved uses.152 In addition, the marketing team aggressively distinguished
Bextra from competitors on the market, such as Pharmacia’s drug, Celebrex, which
was used for chronic pain conditions, and Merck’s drug Vioxx, another Cox-2
inhibitor.153 The marketing team created visual aids stating that Bextra was for
“acute pain” and Celebrex was for “chronic pain.”154 Pharmacia also had its sales
representatives tell doctors to replace Vioxx with Bextra even though Vioxx was
approved by the FDA for acute pain and Bextra was not.155 The sales
representatives also claimed that Bextra was safer and more effective than Vioxx,
despite the fact that no studies existed to back up the claim.156 In addition, the sales
representatives told doctors that the cardiovascular concerns that existed with
Vioxx were specific to Vioxx and not all Cox-2 inhibitors.157 Thus, they convinced
doctors that there was no proportional increase of hypertension or edema with the

145. Information, supra note 144, at ¶ 3.
146. Id. ¶ 2. Pharmacia holds the patent for Bextra. Id. ¶ 3.
147. Id. ¶ 14.
148. Id.
149. Id. ¶ 15.
150. See id. ¶ 18. When Bextra was studied in patients undergoing coronary artery bypass
graft surgery, there was an excess of serious cardiovascular thromboembolic events. Id. In
October 2004, a second study on the use of Bextra on coronary artery bypass graft surgery
patients was made public. It showed a “statistically significant increase in thromboembolic
cardiovascular events” in those patients. Id. ¶ 20. Thus, the FDA had a warning added to
Bextra’s product label that stated that Bextra was “contraindicated” for treatment of postsurgical pain following coronary artery bypass graft surgery. Id. ¶ 21.
151. Id. ¶ 23.
152. Id. ¶ 25.
153. Id. ¶¶ 24–27.
154. Id.
155. Id. ¶ 55.
156. Id.
157. See id. ¶ 56.
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use of Bextra, notwithstanding the fact that the label clearly indicated that there was
a problem.158
In addition to using the sales force to promote Bextra for off-label uses,
Pharmacia also promoted Bextra through remuneration to physicians and physician
consulting arrangements. Pharmacia targeted physicians to participate in advisory
boards or consultant meetings to transform high-prescribing physicians into
Pharmacia Cox-2 “advocates.”159 Pharmacia paid the cost of airfare and two-tothree days’ accommodations at luxury resorts for the influential physicians to
attend consultant meetings.160 They also paid for recreational activities such as golf
and spa treatments, and Pharmacia paid doctors from $1000 to $2000 to attend.161
From late 2001 to late 2003, Pharmacia held approximately 100 consultant
meetings and promoted unapproved uses of Bextra to over 5000 health care
professionals.162 Pharmacia also paid these physician advocates to present at
lunches and dinners where they would promote the drug for unapproved uses.163
Further, Pharmacia funded CME programs for the purpose of promoting Bextra
for acute pain and surgical pain. Pharmacia hired advertising agencies to prepare
promotional slides for Bextra and then had other vendors certify the slides as
CME.164 The slides were then distributed to the “advocates” so that they could use
the slides at CME events as well.165 In addition to the slides, Pharmacia initiated,
funded, sponsored, and sometimes drafted or hired medical writer vendors to write
articles about Bextra for unapproved uses and dosages in order to promote these
uses and dosages, without appropriately disclosing Pharmacia’s role in the
process.166 Pharmacia actually had a “manuscript development” process where it
planned potential publications and found authors for them. The goal of the process
was to promote messages such as “Acute Pain: BEXTRA Provides Rapid, Powerful
Pain Relief in surgical pain.”167
As was the case with Neurontin, Pfizer’s illegal promotion of Bextra came to
light because of several whistleblower suits brought under the FCA.168 It was not

158. Id. ¶¶ 55–58.
159. Id. ¶ 33.
160. Id. ¶ 36.
161. Id.
162. Id. ¶ 37.
163. Information, supra note 144, at ¶ 38.
164. Id. ¶¶ 69–71.
165. Id.
166. Id. ¶ 73.
167. Id. ¶¶ 74–75.
168. The qui tam actions against Pfizer included: United States ex rel. Collins v. Pfizer,
Inc., No. 04-11780-DPW (D. Mass. 2004); United States ex rel. Kopchinski v. Pfizer, Inc.,
No. 05-CV-12115 (D. Mass. 2005); United States ex rel. Spencer v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 0512326 (D. Mass. 2005); United States ex rel. DeMott v. Pfizer, No. 05-12040 (D. Mass.
2005); United States ex rel. Farber v. Pfizer, No. 07-10304 (D. Mass. 2007); United States
ex rel. Rainero v. Pfizer, No. 07-11728 (D. Mass. 2007); United States ex rel. Westlock v.
Pfizer, Inc., No. 08-11318 (D. Mass. 2008); United States ex rel. Liter v. Pfizer, No. 0600176 (E.D. Ky. 2006); and United States ex rel. Kruszewski v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 07-4106
(E.D. Pa. 2007). U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 1–2 (Aug. 31, 2009),
available

at

http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/Pfizer/Pfizer%20Settlement%20
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discovered through the monitoring or compliance efforts that Pfizer undertook as
part of its 2004 CIA. In the end, the government was either unable or unwilling to
pull the trigger by taking Pfizer to court and pursuing the remedy of blanket
exclusion from federal health care programs. Instead, Pfizer and the government
settled for $2.3 billion and entered into another CIA to replace the CIA that was
still in effect at the time of the illegal promotional activities.169 As part of the
settlement with the government, Pfizer created a shell company that was a
subsidiary of Pharmacia to plead guilty to a felony and be excluded from Medicare
and Medicaid.170 The shell subsidiary never bought, sold, or marketed a single
drug. The exclusion was a façade to cover the fact that the government protected
Pfizer.
The 2009 Pfizer CIA, much like the 2004 CIA, required Pfizer to have a
compliance officer and committee. The 2009 CIA, however, forbids Pfizer’s
general counsel (GC) or chief financial officer (CFO) from being the compliance
officer.171 It also prohibits the compliance officer from being subordinate to either
the GC or CFO.172 In addition, the 2009 CIA makes Pfizer’s audit committee
“responsible for the review and oversight of matters related to compliance with
Federal health care program requirements, FDA requirements, and the obligations
of this CIA.”173 As part of its responsibilities, the audit committee must evaluate
the effectiveness of Pfizer’s compliance program and adopt a resolution
documenting its review and oversight of the compliance program.174 The 2009 CIA
also has a “Management Accountability and Certifications” section that requires the
presidents of Pfizer’s business units and the finance director of each business unit
within World Pharmaceutical Operations to certify that “the leadership teams of the
respective [business unit] have taken all appropriate steps to ensure compliance,
that the leadership team has not directly or indirectly encouraged policy violation,
and that controls are operating effectively.”175 Thus, the 2009 CIA attempted to

Agreement.pdf.

169. See CIA PFIZER 2009, supra note 102, at 1 (acknowledging 2004 CIA).
170. Drew Griffin & Andy Segal, Feds Found Pfizer Too Big To Nail, CNN (Apr. 2,
2010, 4:44 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/04/02/pfizer.bextra/index.html
(explaining that the “[p]ublic records show that the subsidiary was incorporated in Delaware
on March 27, 2007, the same day Pfizer lawyers and federal prosecutors agreed that the
company would plead guilty in a kickback case against a company Pfizer had acquired a few
years earlier.”).
171. CIA PFIZER 2009, supra note 102, at 4.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 5.
174. Id. The CIA states that the resolution must include the following language:
The Audit Committee has made a reasonable inquiry into the operations of
Pfizer’s Compliance Program, including but not limited to evaluating its
effectiveness and receiving updates about the activities of its Chief Compliance
Officer and other compliance personnel. Based on its inquiry, the Audit
Committee has concluded that, to the best of its knowledge, Pfizer has
implemented an effective Compliance Program to meet Federal health care
program requirements, FDA requirements, and the obligations of the CIA.
Id. The resolution must be signed by each member of the Audit Committee. Id.
175. Id. at 6. The certification must state that the certifying individual:
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increase accountability for compliance by requiring people higher in the
organization to certify compliance. Additionally, Pfizer was required to provide
notice of the settlement for off-label promotion to health care providers and
entities.176 Pfizer was also required to post on its website a list of all payments
made to physicians during the term of the CIA.177
Remarkably, despite the egregious nature of the violations and the fact that they
were taking place at the same time that Pfizer was entering into the 2004 CIA, the
government spared Pfizer from the more onerous certification requirements
imposed on some of its competitors. Unlike Eli Lilly and Cephalon—which entered
into CIAs in 2008 for off-label promotion of drugs—Pfizer was not required to
have the CEO certify compliance with the federal health care laws, FDA
regulations, and the CIA.178 Nor was Pfizer required to plead guilty to a
misdemeanor misbranding charge, unlike Eli Lilly and Cephalon. Instead, Pfizer
was allowed to create a shell subsidiary that then went into court, pled guilty to a
felony misbranding charge, and was excluded from Medicare and Medicaid. Of
course in each case, the government crafted the guilty plea so as to save the
pharmaceutical manufacturer from exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid.
Perhaps the government settled because it was apprehensive about its untested
theories for finding misbranding violations based on off-label promotion. But if
there was ever a strong case for such a theory, it was this case. The evidence clearly
demonstrated that Pfizer was engaging in deceitful promotional activities. This was
not a case where Pfizer was simply disseminating truthful medical or scientific
information regarding the off-label uses of its product. Instead, Pfizer was
promoting its product as if it were safe for uses that the FDA had clearly
determined were not safe. Thus, it was probably not the uncertainty of a conviction
1) has reviewed the following: (a) reports from an internal group within Pfizer
formed to conduct promotional quality assessments; (b) summary reports of
speaker programs, advisory boards, consultant payments, travel; and
entertainment expenses; (c) sales compensation exclusion criteria; and (d)
corporate compliance group statistics; and
2) is currently aware of no violations of law, regulation, Pfizer policy, or the
CIA requirements; or,
3) in the event that a potential issue has been identified, the certifying
individual has referred the potential violations to the Corporate Compliance
Group or a member of the Pfizer legal division for further review and follow
up. The certification shall also state that the signatory understands that
certification is being provided to and relied upon by the United States.
Id.
176. Id. at 35–36.
177. CIA P FIZER 2009, supra note 102, at 36–38. Payments under the agreement include
all payments “made in connection with physicians serving as speakers, participating in
speaker training, or serving as Consultants or Authors; payments or compensation for
services rendered; grants; fees; payments relating to research; payments relating to
education; and payment or reimbursement for food, entertainment, gifts, trips or travel,
product(s)/item(s) provided for less than fair market value, or other economic benefit paid or
transferred.” Id. at 38.
178. See CIA CEPHALON, supra note 111, at 6 (requiring certification by the CEO and
Chairman); CIA ELI LILLY, supra note 111, at 6–7 (requiring certification by President and
CEO).
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that kept this case out of court. It is more likely that the government settled with the
pharmaceutical giant and entered into another CIA because it was concerned about
the collateral consequences for Pfizer, its employees, and millions of patients.
It is also possible that the government was motivated by financial
considerations. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA) established a national Health Care Fraud and Abuse Program under the
joint direction of the Attorney General and the Secretary of HHS, acting through
OIG.179 Under this program, the DOJ and OIG can use their civil and criminal fraud
recoveries to expand their budgets, staff, and authority.180 HIPAA requires that an
amount equaling recoveries from health care investigations—including criminal
fines, forfeitures, civil settlements and judgments, and administrative penalties, but
excluding restitution and compensation to the victim agency—be deposited in the
Medicare Trust Fund.181 HIPAA then appropriates monies from the Medicare Trust
Fund in amounts that the Secretary of HHS and Attorney General jointly certify as
necessary to finance antifraud activities.182 In 2006, the Tax Relief and Health Care
Act (TRHCA) amended HIPAA so that funds allotted from the account are
available until expended.183 TRHCA also allowed for yearly increases to the
account based on the change in the consumer price index for all urban consumers.
During fiscal year 2009, the DOJ and OIG certified $266,425,206 in mandatory
funding for appropriation to the account.184 Additionally, Congress appropriated
$198 million in discretionary funding.185 By settling with the pharmaceutical
companies rather than taking them to court, OIG is guaranteed a large cut of the
settlements. Further, the threat of blanket exclusion is enough to transform a
questionable fraud case into a multimillion dollar settlement.
The government’s motivations for entering into a CIA with Pfizer in 2009 are
not completely clear. What is clear, however, is that the government’s use of
successive CIAs with Pfizer rather than exclusion is not an isolated incident. In
2005, Eli Lilly paid $36 million and entered into a consent decree with the
government to settle charges related to its off-label promotion of its osteoporosis
drug Evista for the prevention of breast cancer.186 The FDA had approved Evista
for osteoporosis but rejected it for the prevention of breast cancer.187 The consent

179. See THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2009 3–4 (May 2010) [hereinafter FRAUD & ABUSE REPORT 2009], available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/ docs/hcfac/hcfacreport2009.pdf.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 303 120 Stat. 2922, 2949–50 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. §
233).
184. See FRAUD & ABUSE REPORT 2009, supra note 179, at 3–4 (describing the process).
185. Id.
186. Eli Lilly and Company to Pay U.S. $36 Million Relating to Off-Label Promotion,
supra note 6.
187. Two years after the settlement, the FDA approved Evista for the prevention of breast
cancer. Press Release, Eli Lilly, FDA Approves Lilly’s Osteoporosis Drug EVISTA®
(raloxifene HCl) to Reduce The Risk of Invasive Breast Cancer in Two Populations of
Postmenopausal Women (Sep. 14, 2007), available at http://newsroom.lilly.com/
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decree had many of the provisions common in CIAs, including certification
requirements, training requirements, and review by an IRO.188 Eli Lilly pled guilty
to a misdemeanor misbranding charge, which did not lead to exclusion from
Medicare and Medicaid.189 In 2009, Eli Lilly paid $1.415 billion and entered into a
CIA with the government to settle charges related to its off-label promotion of
Zyprexa.190 As previously mentioned, the 2009 Eli Lilly CIA requires certifications
of compliance by the company’s president and CEO.191 Eli Lilly also pled guilty to
a misdemeanor misbranding charge as part of the agreement, again not leading to
exclusion of the drug maker from Medicare and Medicaid.192
In 2005, Novartis Pharmaceuticals entered into a CIA due to its payment of
kickbacks involving nutritional products.193 Its subsidiary, OPI Products, pled
guilty and was excluded from Medicare and Medicaid.194 In May of 2010, Novartis
settled with the government for $72.5 million to resolve false claims allegations
concerning its drug TOBI.195 There was no CIA or admission of guilt involved in
the settlement.196 Later that same year, in September of 2010, Novartis settled with
the government for $422.5 million for off-label promotion of its drug Trileptal and
entered into a CIA.197 As part of the CIA, Novartis was required to have the
president of Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation (NPC) and head pharma, North
America, executive vice president and North American region head, oncology, and
many other executive vice presidents certify compliance with the federal health
care laws and FDA regulations.198 Novartis Pharmaceuticals, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Novartis, pled guilty to a felony misbranding charge and was
excluded from Medicare and Medicaid, sparing its parent Novartis from
exclusion.199
releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=264036.
188. Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction, U.S. v. Eli Lilly and Company (2005) (on
file with author).
189. Information, U.S. v. Eli Lilly and Company (2005) (on file with the author).
190. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pharmaceutical Company Eli Lilly to Pay
Record $1.415 Billion for Off-Label Drug Marketing (Jan. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/News/Pr/2009/jan/lillyrelease.pdf.
191. CIA ELI LILLY, supra note 111, at 6–7.
192. Information, United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., (E.D. Pa. 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/News/2009/jan/lillyinfo.pdf.
193. THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2005
16 (Aug. 2006) [hereinafter FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL REPORT FY 2005], available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/hcfacreport2005.pdf.
194. Id. at 15.
195. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics to Pay More
than $72 Million to Resolve False Claims Allegations Concerning TOBI (May 4, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 2010/May/10-civ-522.html.
196. See id.
197. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation to Pay
$422.5 Million for Off-Label Drug Marketing (Sept. 30, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/Pharma-Device/novartis_release.pdf.
198. CIA CEPHALON, supra note 111, at 7–8.
199. Information, United States v. Novartis Pharm., (E.D. Pa. 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/Pharma-Device/novartis_information.pdf.
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In 2004, Schering Sales Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of ScheringPlough Corporation, pled guilty, entered into a CIA, and paid $52.5 million to settle
charges related to a kickback arrangement involving its drug Claritin.200 In 2006,
Schering-Plough Corporation paid $435 million to settle civil and criminal charges
related to kickbacks and off-label promotion of its drugs Temodar and Intron A.201
To settle the criminal charges, Schering Sales Corporation pled guilty to one count
of criminal conspiracy to make false statements to the FDA regarding illegal
promotional activities.202 Schering Sales was subsequently excluded from
participation in Medicare and Medicaid.203 Schering-Plough’s 2004 CIA was
amended to require the manufacturer “to continue extensive work that the
Company has undertaken in the last two years to monitor and correct the
shortcomings in Schering’s drug sales, marketing and pricing activities.”204 In
addition, there are other pharmaceutical companies that have entered into CIAs to
resolve claims of off-label promotion or kickbacks that are currently under
investigation for marketing violations.205
On the one hand, the government is using the threat of exclusion to win large
settlements and get sweeping reforms in CIAs. On the other hand, the government
is unwilling to go to court, obtain a conviction, and exclude a pharmaceutical
manufacturer because the harm to the company, its shareholders, and, most
importantly, its patients, would be too great. As the prosecutor in the Pfizer case

200. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. AND DEP’T OF JUSTICE HEALTH CARE FRAUD
ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2004 (2004), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/hcfacreport2004.htm.
201. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Schering to Pay $435 Million for the Improper
Marketing of Drugs and Medicaid Fraud (Aug. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/Schering-Plough/press%20release.pdf.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.; ADDENDUM TO CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND SCHERINGPLOUGH CORP. (Aug. 25, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/ScheringPlough/Integrity%20Agreement.pdf. In 2009, Merck purchased Schering-Plough. See David
Jolly, Merck Agrees to Acquire Schering-Plough for $41 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/09/business/worldbusiness/09iht-drug.html. Merck is no
stranger to CIAs. Merck paid the government $650 million and entered into a CIA for its
illegal kickback scheme involving the drugs Zocor and Vioxx in 2008. Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Merck to Pay More than $650 Million to Resolve Claims of Fraudulent
Price Reporting and Kickbacks (Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2008/February/08_civ_094.html.
205. For example, in 2010 Johnson & Johnson’s subsidiary, Ortho-McNeil-Janssen
Pharmaceuticals, entered into a CIA and paid $81 million to resolve allegations that it
promoted its drug Topamax for off-label uses. Ortho-McNeil Janssen Pharmaceuticals is also
currently under investigation for off-label promotion of its drug Risperdal. See CORPORATE
INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND ORTHO-MCNEIL-JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
(2010),
available
at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/ortho_mcneil_janssen_
04282010.pdf; Margaret Cronin Fisk & David Voreacos, J&J Unit Marketed Risperdal OffLabel, Ex-Workers Say (Update2), BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2009, 4:46 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=akvy0MGjJcGY.
AND
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said, the payment of large fines for off-label marketing is simply “a cost of doing
business.”206 The same could be said about hiring a compliance officer and
enacting an extensive compliance program. A pharmaceutical company can make
billions in sales from marketing a drug for off-label uses over the course of several
years. In the event that the drug manufacturer gets caught, it pays a fine that is only
a fraction of the revenue that it earned through its illegal marketing practices.207
Pfizer’s experience with the drug Neurontin is telling. In the year 2000 alone,
Neurontin earned $2.3 billion, and 78% of Neurontin prescriptions (approximately
$1.8 billion) were for off-label uses.208 The settlement for Neurontin was $430
million.209
So long as the revenue from marketing a drug for off-label uses eclipses the fine
to be imposed for the illegal practice, the pharmaceutical manufacturers will
continue to engage in illegal marketing activities. Indeed, the fine can never truly
match the profits generated because not all of the off-label prescriptions are
reimbursed by Medicare and Medicaid and the government can only recover what
they were defrauded. The trend is disturbing because of the message that it sends to
pharmaceutical manufacturers—it is permissible to deceive the public about the
safety and efficacy of your drugs because you will not be excluded from Medicare
and Medicaid so long as you are willing to pay a fraction of your profits to the
government and enter into a CIA. Indeed, repeat offender Pfizer is so sure of that
proposition that it recently acquired Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, despite the fact that
Wyeth is under investigation for off-label promotion of its kidney drug
Rapamune.210

206. John Loucks, who was the prosecutor in the Pfizer case regarding off-label
promotion of Bextra, explained that the money to be earned from off-label promotion “is so
great” that pharmaceutical companies may consider any fines paid to the government as a
business cost. Griffin & Segal, supra note 170; see also George S. Craft, Jr., Comment,
Promoting Off-Label in Pursuit of Profit: An Examination of a Fraudulent Business Model,
8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 103, 105 (2007) (“Off-label promotion can be an extremely
profitable and common marketing strategy for pharmaceutical companies.”).
207. SAMMY ALMASHAT & TIMOTHY WATERMAN, PUB. CITIZEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH
GRP., RAPIDLY INCREASING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES AGAINST THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: 1991 TO 2010, at 21 (2010), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/rapidlyincreasingcriminalandcivilpenalties.pdf
(“Thus,
these financial penalties, although increasing, remain a very small fraction of company net
profits and therefore do not provide a sufficient deterrent against further violations.”).
208. Melody Petersen, Pfizer Nears Drug Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2003),
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cyberlaw2005/sites/cyberlaw2005/images/Neurontin_NYTimes
_Article.pdf.
209. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to
Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May 13,
2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm.
210. Duff Wilson, U.S. Joins Pfizer Suit over Drug’s Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
2010, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/22/business/22drug.html.
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B. Theories of Punishment
The crucial issue is whether CIAs are an effective remedy for pharmaceutical
manufacturers’ marketing violations. By entering into a CIA, the manufacturer is
able to safeguard its business and largely escape corporate criminal liability and the
collateral consequences that flow from it. In particular, manufacturers are spared
from exclusion. Thus, an examination of criminal liability and exclusion as
compared to CIAs is integral to the question of the effectiveness of CIAs.
Corporations are vicariously liable for the criminal acts of their employees if the
employees were acting (1) within the scope of their employment and (2) for the
benefit of the corporation.211 Thus, there is no doubt that if a sales person’s
promotion of drugs for off-label use is criminal, then a pharmaceutical
manufacturer would be held criminally responsible for that conduct, because drug
sales are within the employee’s scope of employment and the company would
benefit from the increased sales. It would not matter for purposes of the
manufacturer’s liability if the sales person engaged in off-label promotion to
increase her own commissions or if her actions were contrary to company policy.212
Although scholars have rightfully criticized both the existence of and the standards
for imposing corporate criminal liability,213 it is a doctrine that is unlikely to change
in the near future. Thus, this Article takes the notion of corporate criminal liability
and the current standard as a given. This Part will examine both the goals of
corporate criminal punishment and the goals of the statutorily provided health care

211. Corporations are fictional persons that may only act through their agents. A
corporation is liable for the criminal acts of its employee if the individual acted within the
scope of employment and with the intent to benefit the corporation. Katrice Bridges
Copeland, Preserving the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1199,
1201 (2010).
212. See id.; United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (upholding firm’s conviction despite the fact that the firm was also defrauded by its
agent’s scheme); United States v. Hilton Hotels Co., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972)
(“[A] corporation is liable for acts of its agents within the scope of their authority even when
done against company orders.”).
213. See, e.g., Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035 (2008)
(arguing that corporate criminal liability should be eliminated and replaced with an insurance
system that would cover civil-related penalties associated with individual employees’
criminal conduct); Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does It Make
Sense?, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1437 (2009) (arguing that an effective compliance program
should be an affirmative defense to corporate criminal liability); John Hasnas, The
Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1329 (2009) (arguing that there is no theoretical justification for corporate criminal
liability); Barry J. Pollack, Time to Stop Living Vicariously: A Better Approach to Corporate
Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1393 (2009) (arguing that corporations should only
be held criminally liable for the acts of their employees when those acts manifest the
collective criminal intent of the corporation); Andrew Weissman, A New Approach to
Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1319 (2007) (arguing that, to establish
corporate criminal liability, the government should have to show that the corporation did not
have an effective compliance program).

1066

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 87:1033

fraud criminal punishments, and whether those goals can be reached through the
use of civil administrative settlements (in this case, CIAs).
1. Justification for Corporate Criminal Liability
There are many policy reasons for holding corporations criminally liable for the
acts of their employees. One justification that has been advanced by Professor
Pamela Bucy is that corporations should be subject to criminal liability because
they take actions that have the potential to harm many people.214 The act of
promoting drugs for unsafe uses, for example, could potentially harm millions of
patients. Patients could suffer adverse consequences or even die if drugs are used
improperly. Because criminal prosecution is the strongest sanction that we have, it
should be imposed on any societal actor that engages in misconduct with the
potential to harm many people.215
Second, Professor Bucy argues that “corporations pose unique opportunities for
unlawful behavior to occur.”216 As a result, it is more difficult to control
organizations than it is to control individuals who are working outside of the
corporate form.217 Criminal activity can flourish within a corporation due to group
dynamics putting pressure on individuals to acquiesce in the wrongdoing. 218
Indeed, as Professor Samuel Buell has explained, “pressures on the individual in
the group setting can make it extremely difficult to recognize, reveal, or stop
harmful behavior once it begins.”219 In addition, criminal activity can prosper
within a corporation because the corporate form may make it difficult to detect
violations of the law.220
Another key justification for corporate criminal liability is that it encourages
corporations to monitor their employees and punish them for any misconduct. As
Professor John Hasnas explains, because the current standard for corporate criminal
liability has such a low threshold, “organizations can avoid criminal liability only
by preventing their employees from violating the law.”221 But this goal can only be

214. Bucy, supra note 213, at 1437.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. Due to group dynamics, individuals may “suspend their own judgment and
disregard their usual sense of caution. Because of the pressure to hold on to a job, or please
the boss and coworkers, the workplace presents especially strong temptations to ‘go along.’”
Id. at 1437–38.
219. Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J.
473, 496 (2006). Professor Buell explains that “[a]n institutional actor who commits a first,
perhaps small violation of a norm or rule is likely to rationalize the violation to herself in
order to avoid signaling guilt and insecurity to peers and supervisors. Incrementally worse
violations will be equally rationalized in order to maintain cognitive consistency. As the
seriousness of violations increases, the actor may eventually appreciate the depth of her
predicament and take increasing risks, causing greater harm, in order to avoid detection of
what began as a minor transgression.” Id.
220. Bucy, supra note 213, at 1437.
221. John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
579, 639 (2005).
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achieved if the corporation engages in information gathering and “intense”
monitoring of all actions those employees take within the scope of their
employment.222
2. Justifications for Criminal Punishment
There are two basic justifications for criminal punishment—utilitarian and
retributivist. The utilitarian, or “consequentialist,” justification for punishment is
based on the future benefits it will provide.223 The future benefit most often
mentioned is deterrence. Thus, punishment is beneficial if it helps to prevent future
crimes.224 A retributivist, or “just deserts” view, on the other hand asserts that
punishment is valuable in and of itself if it gives the wrongdoer what she deserves
for prior misconduct.225 Thus, a utilitarian punishes because of the future benefit
and a retributivist punishes because it is morally right to do so. Therefore, many
scholars consider these two views of punishment to be diametrically opposed.226
This Article will focus on utilitarianism because it is the stated goal of both the
exclusion statute and the justification for CIAs.
Utilitarianism is concerned with reducing crime while minimizing societal
costs.227 Negative societal costs include the crime itself, increased fear in others,
the impact on the victim of the crime, crime prevention, crime enforcement, and the
pain that the criminal endures due to the punishment.228 On the other hand, society
benefits from punishment when it deters future criminal conduct.229 Deterrence has
two aspects—general deterrence and specific deterrence. Punishment furthers
general deterrence when the threat of punishment deters potential offenders in the
general community.230 Punishment also furthers specific deterrence when punishing
a convicted defendant makes that defendant less likely to engage in future crime.231
Under the economic theory of criminal law, an individual will be deterred from
engaging in criminal conduct when the individual “feel[s] ‘costs’ equivalent to the

222. Id.
223. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U.L. REV. 453,
454 (1997).
224. See id.
225. Id. at 454.
226. Id. As Robinson and Darby explain, the debate over the justification for punishing
criminals has a long history. Although Jeremy Bentham is credited with announcing the
deterrence theory of punishment and Immanuel Kant is credited with the “just deserts”
theory of punishment, the justifications can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle,
respectively. Id. at 455.
227. Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 208 (2003) (“The primary consequentialist
theory—utilitarianism—imposes criminal penalties only to the extent that social benefits
(utility) outweigh the costs of punishment.”).
228. Carl Emigholz, Note, Utilitarianism, Retributivism and the White Collar-Drug
Crime Sentencing Disparity: Toward a Unified Theory of Enforcement, 58 RUTGERS L. REV.
583, 599 (2006).
229. Id.
230. Luna, supra note 227, at 209.
231. Id.
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harm they cause society, modified by the probability that they will be punished.”232
Thus, the individual will decide not to engage in criminal conduct when the costs of
committing the crime outweigh the net benefits of doing so.233 The costs of
engaging in criminal conduct include both the punishment that the individual will
receive upon conviction and the harm to the individual’s reputation.234 In the
corporate context, there are other collateral consequences of conviction, such as the
loss of government contracts, suspension and debarment, and exclusion from
federal health care programs.235
Deterrence can be achieved through increasing either the likelihood of detection
or the severity of punishment.236 In order for deterrence to be effective, however,
the potential criminal must understand the threat of punishment, which means
weighing the potential benefits of the crime against the chance of being caught, the
chance of being convicted, and the severity of punishment.237 Corporate actors are
viewed as deterrable because they regularly engage in cost/benefit analyses when
making business decisions.238 The difficulty lies in the fact that many offenders,
particularly in the white collar context, may be “unrealistically optimistic about the
precautions they take to avoid being caught, or the simple likelihood of being
caught, and thus may underestimate that probability.”239 Further, potential criminals
often discount the cost of punishment because they believe that if they are actually
convicted, any punishment will take place in the distant future.240 This concern is
heightened in the health care fraud context due to the multi-year investigations that
precede any imposed sanction. The question is: at what point does an increase in
the cost of punishment equal the corresponding reduction in benefits from that
cost?241
If one ascribes to neoclassical criminal law and economics, then the criminal
sanction should be set roughly at the value of the harm caused by the defendant
adjusted for the probability of her punishment.242 Because sanctions and harm are
not always monetary in nature, the government sanction may not precisely replicate
the harm the defendant causes, even if one accounts for the probability of detection
and punishment.243 As such, there may be an over- or under-deterrence problem

232. Miriam H. Baer, Evaluating the Consequences of Calibrated Sentencing: A
Response to Professor Kolber, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 11, 11 (2009) (citing Gary S.
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968)).
233. Luna, supra note 227, at 209.
234. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1205 (1985) (“Almost every criminal punishment imposes some nonpecuniary
disutility in the form of a stigma . . . .”).
235. Copeland, supra note 211, at 1202 n.17.
236. Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in
Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 956–57 (2003).
237. See Luna, supra note 227, at 212.
238. See Bucy, supra note 213, at 1438.
239. Robinson & Darley, supra note 223, at 460.
240. Id. at 460–62.
241. See Emigholz, supra note 228, at 599.
242. Baer, supra note 232, at 13 (citing Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968); Posner, supra note 234).
243. See id. at 13–14.
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associated with the government-chosen sanction. If an individual is over-deterred
by the government sanction, she will be risk averse. In the corporate context, this
can lead to increased costs and lost business opportunities.244 On the other hand, if
an individual is under-deterred by the government-set sanction, she will commit
more crimes and cause more harm to society because she does not view the
sanction as an impediment. In the corporate setting, under-deterrence can be even
more detrimental because of the potential for harmful conduct to impact a greater
number of people.245 Thus, it is important to strike the correct balance in punishing
corporations.
3. The Exclusion Provision and Deterrence
The overarching purpose of the five-year mandatory exclusion period is
remedial in nature. As the Senate Finance Committee Report states:
The basic purpose of the [Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program
Protection Act] is to improve the ability of the Secretary and the
Inspector General of [HHS] to protect Medicare, Medicaid, [and other
social services programs] from fraud and abuse, and to protect the
beneficiaries of those programs from incompetent practitioners and
from inappropriate or inadequate care.246
The committee report also states, however, that the law “should provide a clear and
strong deterrent against the commission of criminal acts.”247 On its face, the
exclusion provision applies both to individual doctors and to manufacturers.
a. Exclusion of Doctors
When it comes to individual doctors and medical practices, the exclusion
remedy is an effective deterrent against the commission of health care fraud.
Doctors who commit health care fraud often engage in practices that result in
Medicare and Medicaid being overcharged for medical services, such as overbilling
for services performed, performing and billing for unnecessary procedures, billing
for services that have not been provided, and billing for patients who do not
exist.248 In addition, physicians can be convicted of health care fraud for taking
kickbacks on prescriptions or referrals.249 Because billing practices are
complicated, it is difficult to detect violations, which makes the likelihood of

244. See Baer, supra note 213, at 1062.
245. See Bucy, supra note 213, at 1437 (“[C]orporations often engage in activity that
harm lots of people. Mislabeling drugs, shipping contaminated food, dumping pollutants into
waterways, and falsifying financial data are a few obvious examples.”).
246. S. REP. NO. 100-109, at 1–2 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 682.
247. Id. at 5.
248. See Diane E. Hoffmann, Physicians Who Break the Law, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1049,
1051–52 (2009).
249. Id. at 1052.
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detection low.250 When doctors are caught committing health care fraud, however,
OIG has not shied away from invoking the exclusion remedy.251
The exclusion of a doctor from Medicare and Medicaid can have a far reaching
impact on the doctor. An excluded doctor can no longer be reimbursed for treating
Medicare or Medicaid patients. Thus, the doctor would have to stop treating
Medicare and Medicaid patients. In some situations, the doctor will lose his or her
license due to the fraudulent activities and will need to close the practice. Although
patients will potentially be harmed by a disruption in treatment, patients can switch
to non-excluded doctors to receive treatment.252 The punishment of exclusion is
exceptionally high, but it is appropriate because the chance of detection is very low.
More importantly, the exclusion remedy is vigorously enforced against doctors.
In fiscal year 2009, 2556 individuals and entities were excluded from Medicare and
Medicaid; 1057 of those exclusions resulted from criminal convictions for
program-related crimes, 239 for patient abuse and neglect, and 895 based on license
revocations.253 Thus, even if the likelihood of detection is not exceptionally high,
once fraud is detected, the likelihood of exclusion is high. Because the exclusion
remedy is regularly applied to doctors, it has the ability to deter physicians from
engaging in health care fraud. As the government regularly excludes doctors who
engage in health care fraud, doctors may begin to associate the punishment of
exclusion with the act of overbilling Medicare and Medicaid, and will constrain
their conduct even if they are not sure they will be caught.
b. CIAs Replace Exclusion of Pharmaceutical Companies
In the case of the exclusion provisions, it seems that blanket exclusion from
federal health care programs would be a remedy that would over-deter
pharmaceutical manufacturers. Under the threat of blanket exclusion, one would
think that pharmaceutical companies would be overly cautious about off-label
promotion and would not even engage in activities that are probably permissible
under the statute, such as distributing truthful and non-misleading medical and
scientific information regarding off-label uses, due to fear that if they were
overzealous in promotion, they would be excluded from Medicare and Medicaid.
One would also think that the exclusion remedy would lead manufacturers to
monitor their employees to make sure that they are not committing any marketing
violations that would lead to exclusion of the manufacturer. Ironically, the opposite
has occurred. For years, pharmaceutical manufacturers have engaged in egregious
violations of the laws regarding off-label promotion of drugs by promoting the
drugs for purposes that the scientific data does not support. This is largely due to
both under-enforcement of the blanket exclusion remedy against pharmaceutical

250. See id. at 1052–53.
251. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Exclusions Program, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/
exclusions.asp.
252. Admittedly, the harm will be greater for patients who live in a rural area with few
doctors or who are being treated for a rare disease by a specialist. In those situations,
however, the Secretary has the authority to waive the exclusion. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a7(c)(3)(B) (2006).
253. FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL REPORT FY 2005, supra note 193, at 35.
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manufacturers and the low likelihood of detection.254 Understandably, the
government also has been unwilling to inflict harm on innocent patients and
employees through its pursuit of blanket exclusion of pharmaceutical
manufacturers.255 The government has replaced the blanket exclusion remedy with
CIAs, thereby undermining the statutory scheme created by Congress to deter
Medicare and Medicaid participants from engaging in health care fraud.
“[D]eterrence is a function of both the sanction level and the probability that it
will be imposed.”256 The five-year exclusionary period that was meant to remedy
and deter has been replaced with the five-year CIA that is meant to create
“structural reform.”257 If one subscribes to utilitarianism, the substitution makes
some logical sense. Under utilitarianism, criminal penalties will only be imposed to
the point where social benefits outweigh the costs of punishment.258 In this
situation, the government has determined that the costs to patients, employees, and
shareholders that would result from excluding pharmaceutical manufacturers from
Medicare and Medicaid outweigh the social benefit of punishing pharmaceutical
manufacturers.
Indeed, the cost of exclusion will not be captured entirely by the manufacturer.
The reality is that the cost will “spill over” onto innocent third parties.259 As
Professor John Coffee explains, “when the corporation catches a cold, someone
else sneezes.”260 Professor Coffee has identified four levels of harm from spillover.
First, the penalty is passed on to stockholders who will see a reduction in the
value of their securities.261 Arguably, the stockholders also benefited from the
increase in stock prices that came along with the unlawful activities. Nevertheless,
a drop in stock price after exclusion would likely be devastating to stockholders.
Second, the penalty impacts bond and credit holders who will also see a decline
in the value of the securities that secure the investments.262 A large pharmaceutical
company that has been excluded from Medicare and Medicaid due to illegal
marketing activities and has thereby lost Medicare and Medicaid revenue for the
period of exclusion will likely be a riskier investment than a smaller non-excluded
manufacturer.
Third, if the penalty is severe and jeopardizes the solvency of the company, the
penalty harms innocent employees who had no involvement in the inappropriate

254. See supra notes 168–70, 186–206 and accompanying text.
255. Tracy L. Meares, Neal Katyal & Dan M. Kahan, Updating the Study of Punishment,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1185 (2004) (explaining the “inverse sentencing effect” of high
penalties—people are not as willing to enforce high penalties because of the disproportionate
impact on those caught).
256. Id. at 1178.
257. Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 853–61
(2007) (explaining that in “structural reform prosecution,” prosecutors use the threat of
prosecution to secure cooperation and internal reforms).
258. Luna, supra note 227, at 208.
259. John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 401–02 (1981).
260. Id. at 401.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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conduct.263 This is likely due to the fact that the corporation may be forced to fire
employees to save money. Exclusion would lead to the loss of billions of dollars in
revenue that would inevitably lead to a reduction in production and work force.264
Fourth, Professor Coffee explains that consumers will bear the brunt of the
penalty in the form of higher prices for goods.265 Even though the prices of
pharmaceutical drugs are often negotiated with health care plans through pharmacy
benefit managers and may not be able to be changed right away, in all likelihood
manufacturers would attempt to raise the prices of their drugs to compensate for the
loss in revenue from Medicare and Medicaid. Consumers will pay the higher prices
for essential drugs without a close substitute because their demand for drugs is
somewhat inelastic to price.266 In the event that there is a close competitor on the
market, consumers may still pay the high prices rather than encountering any
switching costs that may result from obtaining a new prescription and dealing with
any side effects of the competitor drug. More importantly, the Medicare and
Medicaid patients with prescriptions for drugs manufactured by an excluded
company would suffer severe consequences. Without Medicare or Medicaid to pay
for their drugs, patients would need to switch to a competitor product (if one is on
the market) or pay for the drugs themselves. If they could afford the drugs, they
probably would not be on Medicare or Medicaid in the first place.
A lesser penalty makes sense in this situation because the penalty of exclusion
will exceed the harm inflicted by manufacturers and, more importantly, innocent
third parties will suffer undue harm. It is not clear, however, that CIAs are an
effective deterrent for pharmaceutical manufacturers that engage in illegal
promotional activities. To begin with, CIAs are watered down versions of deferred
prosecution agreements (DPAs). DPAs are used when the prosecutor and the

263. See id. at 401–02.
264. In 2010, the federal government spent more than $59 billion on Medicare
prescription drugs and over $20 billion on Medicaid prescription drugs. See Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, supra note 125. Pfizer has 12% of the U.S. prescription
drug market. Pfizer Press Release, Pfizer to Acquire Wyeth, Creating the World’s Premier
Biopharmaceutical Company (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.pfizer.com/news/press_releases/
pfizer_press_release_archive.jsp#guid=20090126005624en&source=RSS_2009&page=13
(explaining that the combined Pfizer/Wyeth company would have a market share of 12%).
Pfizer’s financial statements do not specify what portion of their annual revenue comes from
Medicare and Medicaid. If you assume, however, that Pfizer receives a portion of the
Medicare and Medicaid payments that is proportional to their share in the market, that
amount would be over $9 billion of revenue in one year from Medicare and Medicaid.
265. Id. at 402. “If the corporation competes in a product market characterized by
imperfect competition (a trait of most of the ‘real world’), then the fine may be recovered
from consumers in the form of higher prices. If this happens, the ‘wicked’ corporation not
only goes unpunished, but the intended beneficiary of the criminal statute (i.e., the
consumer) winds up bearing its penalty.” Id.
266. Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 666, 677 n.66 (1988) (explaining that inelastic
demand “means that demand does not respond, or responds only slightly, to changes in
price”); Natalie J. Tanner, Note, Understanding the Disparity in Availability of Prescription
Drugs in the United States: Compromise May Be The Answer, 2 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 267,
274–75 (2005).
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corporation agree that the prosecutor will not seek immediate criminal action in
exchange for the corporation’s agreement to a specific set of terms laid out in the
DPA.267 In most cases, the corporation will admit guilt to the criminal conduct in
the DPA and agree to hire monitors that have “sweeping powers to gather
information, promulgate policies, and oversee compliance.”268 The federal
prosecutor will file a formal charging document simultaneously with the DPA. If
the prosecutor finds that the corporation has complied with all of the conditions of
the DPA over the specified time period, the prosecutor will withdraw the formal
charging document.269 If the corporation violates the DPA, however, the
government will pursue criminal conviction of the corporation (which will be easy
to obtain due to the admission of guilt in the DPA).270 Thus, DPAs should be
effective in accomplishing specific deterrence of the corporation. It is in the
corporation’s best interest to avoid repeating the criminal conduct during the term
of the agreement. The government has not shied away from prosecuting
corporations that violate the terms of DPAs.271 The ability of DPAs to promote
general deterrence is less clear because even though the government often issues
press releases touting the DPAs, the agreements are not always made publicly
available, nor are they accessible in one central location.272 Further, when
corporations hire monitors as part of a DPA, the monitors are not required to make
their findings regarding potential problems or compliance measures at the
corporations public.273 Thus, it is not easy for other corporations to determine what
conduct the government has determined to be unlawful and to conform their
conduct accordingly. Government regulators and scholars have widely questioned
whether DPAs, with their focus on monitors and compliance programs, are
effective at general deterrence.274

267. Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the
Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 KY. L.J. 1, 1 (2007–08).
268. Garret, supra note 257, at 897.
269. Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 180 (2008).
270. See id. at 161 n.9.
271. See Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and Acquisition
Transactions: Successor Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 247, 280
n.151 (2010) (detailing instances where the government prosecuted corporations for violating
the terms of deferred prosecution agreements).
272. See Spivack & Raman, supra note 269, at 160–61 (explaining that DOJ does not
have a uniform policy regarding the publication of pre-trial diversion agreements); Garrett,
supra note 257, at 938 n.326 (explaining that he compiled DPAs from the DOJ website and
the individual websites of each U.S. Attorneys’ office that entered into a DPA) .
273. Garrett, supra note 257, at 897.
274. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110 CORPORATE CRIME:
DOJ HAS TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION
AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 20 (2009) (explaining that DOJ
intends for these agreements to “promote corporate reform,” but “does not have performance
measures in place to assess whether this goal has been met. Therefore, it could be difficult
for DOJ to justify its increasing use of these tools.”); Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can
Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 679, 703
(2009); Garrett, supra note 257; Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 127; Kimberly D.
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CIAs are less stringent than DPAs because manufacturers are not required to
admit guilt to criminal charges and the threat of criminal punishment for violating
the agreement does not loom over the manufacturer. Thus, the CIA’s effectiveness
as a specific deterrent is lessened by the fact that criminal liability is not a real
threat for the manufacturer even if it violates the CIA. Certainly, CIAs instruct
manufacturers to monitor their employees. The mere fact that manufacturers must
certify compliance with the requirements of the CIA, however, does little to
encourage active monitoring because there is no threat of criminal liability or other
increased sanctions for the drug maker if it fails to comply with the agreement.
Indeed, as Pfizer, Novartis, Eli Lilly, and others have learned, the punishment for
multiple offenses is simply another CIA and another fine. The government has
repeatedly shown its unwillingness to raise the stakes for manufacturers by holding
them criminally liable and using the exclusion remedy. Instead, if the government
does decide to impose criminal liability, it crafts the guilty pleas to ensure that the
drug makers go unharmed.
Although CIAs have the potential to promote general deterrence, the
government’s use of them frustrates that potential. CIAs have some ability to
promote general deterrence in that they are made public and posted on the OIG
website.275 Because enforcement actions are the principal method of developing the
law, making the CIAs public allows pharmaceutical companies to learn about the
conduct the government judges to be unlawful and the specified remedy. Thus,
pharmaceutical companies can view the requirements of another manufacturer’s
CIA and decide to abandon any behavior that is similar to the conduct engaged in
by that manufacturer. Manufacturers could also decide to engage in lawful behavior
because they fear the onerous conditions of the CIA. Further, drug manufacturers
may choose to enact compliance programs modeled on the programs included in
the CIAs. Ultimately, however, CIAs fail as a replacement for blanket exclusion,
because the government has demonstrated that even if a pharmaceutical company
violates the provisions of a CIA, it will waive the violation and enter into another
CIA with the manufacturer. This is in sharp contrast to the government’s reaction
to the violation of a DPA, which leads to criminal charges. Because the penalty for
one, two, or even three more marketing violations is still just a CIA, the penalty
itself does not work to provide additional deterrence. This is particularly true
because the second or third time that a pharmaceutical company enters into a CIA,
it will not have to make a huge financial outlay to enact a compliance program or
comply with government reporting requirements, because those programs already
exist.276 While successive CIAs might increase the reporting requirements, it is
unlikely that large scale restructuring of the organization will be required. The
government’s method of increasing the severity of the penalty on the second CIA—
requiring the pharmaceutical company to designate a subsidiary, which has never
bought, sold, or marketed a single drug, to go into court to plead guilty and be
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U.
L.Q. 487 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of
Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71 (2002); Zierdt & Podgor,
supra note 267.
275. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Corporate Integrity Agreement Documents,
OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/cia_list.asp.
276. See supra notes 168–74 and accompanying text.
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excluded from Medicare and Medicaid—has little impact on the manufacturer.277
Thus, the government’s failure to enforce the CIAs only further lessens the ability
of CIAs to deter drug manufacturers. The end result is that drug manufacturers are
underdeterred from engaging in off-label marketing.278
CIAs are an inadequate deterrent for pharmaceutical companies because the
fines imposed by and the costs of complying with them are too low in comparison
with the profits that can be gained from engaging in off-label promotion. The cost
of the crime—a CIA plus a fine—is simply not high enough to deter drug
manufacturers from committing the crime.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO CIAS
The remedy of blanket exclusion is often used against doctors but seldom used
against large pharmaceutical manufacturers, because, when it comes to
pharmaceutical manufacturers, the resulting harm to innocent patients from
exclusion is too great to justify imposition of the sanction. In place of exclusion,
the government has employed an enforcement strategy aimed at financial recovery
and organizational reform. Simply recouping large sums of money from
pharmaceutical manufacturers and requiring compliance programs, however, does
little to deter them from engaging in fraudulent activities in the future. This Part
examines alternatives to CIAs, including required funding for clinical trials,
compulsory licensing, corporate officer liability, and a more targeted exclusion
remedy. The appropriate choice among these alternatives depends on the harm that
the government is trying to combat. Some of the possibilities include the failure to
perform clinical research, defrauding the government, and unjust enrichment. No
matter what the identifiable harm may be, however, it is important that any remedy
be a deterrent for future misconduct. The appropriate choice among the alternatives
will ultimately depend on the circumstances of the violation.
A. Funding of Clinical Trials
If the tangible harm from off-label promotion is that the public will be deprived
of an important commodity, namely clinical research on the off-label claim, then
one possible remedy is to require that the manufacturer fund clinical trials on the
off-label claim. This remedy could potentially be added to CIAs. Thus, in addition
to any fine and compliance measures, the CIA would require the manufacturer to
provide money to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to fund clinical trials.
This remedy would have the potential to greatly aid the public because there would
be definitive proof to either support or rebut the claim that the drug is safe for the
off-label use.

277. As Lewis Morris of HHS admitted, “[i]t is true that if a company is created to take a
criminal plea, but it’s just a shell, the impact of an exclusion is minimal or nonexistent.”
Griffin & Segal, supra note 170.
278. Meares et al., supra note 255, at 1186 (explaining that when a penalty is increased to
the point that it is out of step with the norms of the community, “it may reduce deterrence
instead of promoting it”).
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If the FDA does not approve the drug for the off-label use because it finds that
the research does not support a finding of safety and efficacy, however, then
requiring the manufacturer to fund clinical research could potentially be a
meaningless exercise. In that situation, it is possible that there is not a lack of
clinical research. Instead, there is a misrepresentation of the research. When the
true harm is a misrepresentation of clinical research rather than a lack of research, a
remedy that requires research does little to address the harm or prevent future
misconduct. On the other hand, it could be the case that the initial research is
simply not adequate for the FDA to make a finding of safety and efficacy.
Certainly, there have been cases in the past where the FDA has not approved a drug
for safety reasons only to approve that drug a few years later after additional
research.279 If the research is inadequate, then requiring the manufacturer to fund
the research could aid the public by providing it with crucial information regarding
drug safety.
Although this remedy addresses the lack of clinical research, its effectiveness as
a deterrent may vary based on when the manufacturer is caught promoting its drugs
for off-label uses. If the drug is early in its patent period, then requiring clinical
research may not be that harmful to the manufacturer’s bottom line. In the event
that the research demonstrates that the product is safe for off-label use, the
manufacturer will apply to the FDA to make the off-label use an approved use and
will have the time and opportunity to recoup the cost of the trials because of the
larger market for its product. Indeed, the profits from the additional use may far
eclipse the cost of the research. Even if the research demonstrates that the drug is
not safe for the off-label use, the manufacturer may be able to compensate for the
loss if the drug is a blockbuster drug and continues to have high sales. Because of
the complicated pricing structures for pharmaceutical drugs,280 the manufacturer
will probably be able to pass the costs on to the consumer.
Conversely, if it is late in the patent period, the manufacturer may not be the
sole beneficiary of learning that the drug is safe for off-label uses. Instead, generic
manufacturers may reap some benefits from that finding as they enter the market to
produce the drug when it goes off patent. There may be some ability, however, to
recoup the research costs if the FDA grants approval for the new use. In those
situations, the manufacturer may be able to get an additional time period to prevent
generic manufacturers from entering the market, termed “market exclusivity,” for a

279. See, e.g., Natasha Singer, Erasing Frown Lines (and Migraine’s), N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
9, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/09/business/09botox.html;
Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Evista Approved for Reducing Breast
Cancer Risk (Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/
ConsumerUpdates/ucm048474.htm.
280. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT:
PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE, SPENDING, UTILIZATION, AND PRICES 95–96 (2000),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/drugstudy/c3.pdf (explaining that the prices
that customers pay for drugs can vary based on, among other things, whether the individual
is a cash customer without insurance, someone who has insurance, or some other third-party
payer and whether the insurance company has negotiated substantial rebates from the drug
manufacturer to offset the price of the drugs).
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period of three years.281 On the other hand, if the research shows that the drug is
unsafe for the off-label use, the manufacturer will not have the opportunity to
recoup the cost of the drug trial. Thus, the remedy would be most effective as a
deterrent late in the patent period regardless of whether the drug is ultimately
proven safe because the manufacturer will have very little, if any, time to recover
the costs of the clinical trial.
One could also argue, however, that funding clinical research will be an
effective deterrent in all cases because the manufacturer will not know ahead of
time whether the illegal activities will be discovered early or late in the patent
period. As such, the manufacturer will want to avoid the substantial costs involved
in conducting clinical research for the off-label uses. The best way to avoid those
costs will be to vigorously monitor employees to make sure that they are not
engaging in off-label promotion. The incentive to monitor, however, may be low in
the beginning of the patent period, where any additional research costs could
potentially be passed on to the consumer. As the patent nears its expiration date,
however, the incentive to monitor rises because of the manufacturer’s inability to
recoup the full research costs if required to perform additional clinical research.
Thus, manufacturers may be more lenient on offending employees at the beginning
of the patent period than at the end of the period.
Despite the potential positive impact of the clinical research remedy, there is the
possibility that it could lead to gamesmanship on the part of pharmaceutical
companies. Pharmaceutical manufacturers will want to extend their monopoly for
as long as possible. Thus, their employment of strategies to delay generic entry may
increase due to this remedy and the resultant cost to the manufacturer. Although a
discussion of these strategies is beyond the scope of this Article,282 their use could
lead to increased profits for the pharmaceutical companies and higher drug costs for
consumers because of the delay in availability of generic drugs. While consumers
will suffer due to increased costs, there is no consumer benefit to offset the costs.
On balance, requiring pharmaceutical manufacturers to fund additional clinical
research on their drugs will lead to a more informed public and will encourage
manufacturers to monitor their employees more carefully. Although the incentives
to monitor may go up and down throughout the patent period, it is likely to be an
effective deterrent due to the high cost associated with additional research—likely
hundreds of millions of dollars—that the manufacturer may not be able to recoup.
B. Compulsory Licensing
Another way to look at the harm from off-label promotion is that it constitutes
unjust enrichment to the manufacturer because the manufacturer is able to profit

281. A Primer: Generic Drugs, Patents and the Pharmaceutical Marketplace, NAT’L
INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. FOUND. 4–5 (June, 2002), http://www.nihcm.org/pdf/
GenericsPrimer.pdf.
282. See, e.g., Stacey B. Lee, Is a Cure on the Way?—The Bad Medicine of Generics,
Citizen Petitions, and Noerr-Pennington Immunity, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 98, 107–08
(2010). See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/
genericdrugstudy.pdf.
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from an unapproved use for a drug. One way the government can recover the gain
is by taking away the future profit potential of the drug. The key to pharmaceutical
profit is patent protection. A patent gives a pharmaceutical manufacturer complete
control over the pricing, production, and sale of a given drug during the patent
period.283 In the pharmaceutical industry, patents are granted to spur future
innovation and to generate new and improved medicines that will benefit the
public.284 The patent offsets the cost of innovation and the risks involved in
developing a new drug because it prevents competitors from imitating and
producing the drug during the patent period.285 But patents only exist through
congressional enactment.286 Thus, the government could restrict the patent rights of
an offending drug company by granting a compulsory license. A compulsory
license would require the drug maker to permit another manufacturer to produce
and sell the patented drug for a pre-established fee or, because the license is a
penalty, no fee at all.287
Compulsory licenses have been used as a remedy in the antitrust context for
anticompetitive behavior.288 Some federal statutes provide for compulsory
licensing.289 They have also been proposed as a solution to the problem of high
drug costs.290 In addition, the Bayh-Dole Act gives the government the power to
compel a license if the patented invention was federally funded.291 As a remedy in
an off-label promotion case, the compulsory license essentially takes away the
profit potential of a patented drug because the patent owner is forced to grant a
license for a rate that the government judges to be “reasonable” rather than a rate
that would compensate the manufacturer for lost profits.292

283. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”).
284. Samuel Mark Borowski, Saving Tomorrow from Today: Preserving Innovation in
the Face of Compulsory Licensing, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 275, 284 (2009) (“[The] incentive
to innovate and invent is a function of four interrelated variables: (1) the costs of innovation
and invention, (2) the risks, (3) the rewards for success, and (4) the rate at which competitive
imitation occurs.”).
285. See id. at 284–86.
286. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
287. Fauver, supra note 266, at 667 (“Compulsory licensing enables the government
granting the patent to force the patentee to license the invention if the government does not
approve of the patent’s use. Consequently, another individual or company is allowed to
make and sell the invention.”); Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical
Patents: An Unreasonable Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295, 300
(1994).
288. Fauver, supra note 266, at 670.
289. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2006); Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2183.
290. Tanner, supra note 266, at 267.
291. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12.
292. Fisch, supra note 287, at 300 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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A compulsory license would revoke the manufacturer’s monopoly and thereby
greatly reduce profitability. Thus, it provides a strong disincentive to violate offlabel prohibitions, as the gap between monopoly pricing (as the owner of the
patent) and competitive pricing (as a licensor) is very large.293 It would also likely
encourage vigorous monitoring of employees. Unlike in the clinical research
context, the incentive to monitor may be higher during the beginning of the patent
period and lower at the end of the patent period. This runs counter to the normal
marketing practices of pharmaceutical companies to try to make the market for the
drug as large as possible in the early patent period to ensure blockbuster status and
high profits. It is the attempt to increase the market size that often leads to off-label
promotion. Thus, in addition to monitoring, the remedy of compulsory licensing
may require pharmaceutical companies to make some reforms to change their
incentive structures.
There are, however, some potential problems with this remedy. First,
compulsory licensing might stifle innovation.294 Manufacturers may be unwilling to
risk making a substantial investment in drug development if the reward from that
investment can be taken away as a remedy for illegal marketing practices. Even
with a serious monitoring program, there is no guarantee that an employee would
not promote the drug for off-label uses leading to liability in the form of licensing
of the patent for the corporation. Without a guarantee of the patent benefits, some
manufacturers may choose not to invest in research and development. As a result,
society would lose out on potentially life-saving drugs. Second, it might overdeter
manufacturers. Because manufacturers would risk the loss of their patent rights,
manufacturers may be overzealous in monitoring their employees. It may even
deter manufacturers from conducting additional research on approved drugs for fear
that some of their salespeople will begin to inform doctors of the new findings.
Third, if the manufacturer is not the patent holder, it may be difficult for the
government to craft the compulsory license to punish the manufacturer without
harming the patent holder. Finally, Congress may have difficulty mustering the
political will to authorize this type of remedy. The pharmaceutical lobby would
vehemently oppose compulsory licensing of its products as a remedy for health
care fraud.
Despite the challenges that may exist for the use of compulsory licenses, it is
hard to deny that their use would substantially raise the stakes for manufacturers. If
a CIA is the first line of defense, but manufacturers know that a repeat offense will
result in a compulsory license, the manufacturer will be less likely to become a
repeat offender. Ultimately, the success of compulsory licenses as a sanction will
depend on the government’s willingness to impose the remedy on a repeat offender.
If the government were willing to make an example out of one manufacturer, other
manufacturers would be on notice that compulsory licenses are a plausible remedy
and would curb their illegal marketing practices to avoid that sanction.

293. See Charles E. Mueller, Sources of Monopoly Power: A Phenomenon Called
‘Product Differentiation,’ 18 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (1968).
294. See, e.g., Glover Statement, supra note 33, at 6 (“[C]ompanies would not be able to
invest the huge amount of time and money it takes to discover and develop a new medicine
if they did not have a sufficient opportunity to make a sufficient return before generic
competitors copy and market the drug at greatly reduced cost.”).
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C. Corporate Officer Liability
The harm in off-label promotions may be that the pharmaceutical companies
have defrauded the government. If the main goal of criminal prosecution of
corporations is to encourage monitoring of lower level employees, then one
possibility is to pursue corporate officers criminally. Although responsibility for
illegal promotional activities is often scattered throughout an organization, it may
be possible for the government to pursue responsible corporate officers. This type
of strategy allows the government to put a face on the fraud. Indeed, the FDA
recently called for more prosecutions of responsible corporate officers under the
FDCA.295
Under the responsible corporate officer (RCO) doctrine, officers are subject to
both criminal and civil liability for corporate violations of statutes involving public
welfare offenses, such as health care fraud.296 The RCO doctrine provides that a
defendant may be guilty if he or she had, “by reason of his [or her] position in the
corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or

295. See Letter from Margaret Hamburg, FDA Comm’r, to the Honorable Charles E.
Grassley, Ranking Member of the Senate Fin. Comm. 2 (Mar. 4, 2010), available at
http://grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/FDA-3-4-10-Hamburg-letter-to-Grassley-re-GAOreport-on-OCI.pdf. The FDA commissioner explained:
A third recommendation from the committee was to increase the appropriate
use of misdemeanor prosecutions, a valuable enforcement tool, to hold
responsible corporate officials accountable. Criteria now have been developed
for consideration in selection of misdemeanor prosecution cases and will be
incorporated into the revised policies and procedures that cover appropriate use
of misdemeanor prosecutions.
Id.
296. The U.S. Supreme Court first articulated the RCO doctrine in United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). In Dotterweich, the Court upheld the conviction of a drug
company’s president and general manager for the company’s shipping of misbranded and
adulterated drugs in interstate commerce. Id. at 278, 285. The employees had repackaged
drugs from the manufacturer and shipped them out to fulfill a doctor’s order. Id. at 278.
Although the Court acknowledged the hardship on individuals whose “consciousness of
wrongdoing be totally wanting” but found it necessary to protect the public from the hazard
of misbranded and adulterated drugs. Id. at 284. In 1975, the Supreme Court once again
approved the application of liability under the RCO doctrine in United States v. Park, 421
U.S. 658 (1975). In Park, the Court affirmed the conviction of a president of a national food
chain whose warehouses were suffering from a rat infestation. Id. at 661. As a result of the
infestation, the food became contaminated. Id. at 662. The president had delegated
warehouse operations to subordinates. Id. at 663. Although someone had notified Park of
unsanitary conditions at another warehouse, and he instructed his subordinates to take
corrective actions, Park had no personal knowledge of unsanitary conditions at the
warehouse in question. See id. at 664–65. The Court explained:
The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate
agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no
more stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who voluntarily
assume positions of authority in business enterprises whose services and
products affect the health and well-being of the public that supports them.
Id. at 672.
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promptly to correct,” the alleged violations of law.297 Thus, the individual need not
have directly participated in the criminal conduct for liability to attach under the
RCO doctrine. Instead, the burden is put on an individual “otherwise innocent but
standing in responsible relation to a public danger.”298 The U.S. Supreme Court
has, however, recognized an impossibility defense when the defendant was
“powerless to prevent or correct the violation.”299 Thus, there needs to be some
level of “blameworthiness” for the doctrine to be imposed, but the Supreme Court
has not been clear on the threshold requirement for responsibility.300 The DOJ
would most likely use the RCO doctrine to charge high-ranking individuals of
pharmaceutical manufacturers with misdemeanor misbranding violations under the
FDCA because of the lack of an intent requirement for that crime. If the individuals
are found guilty, they could face imprisonment, criminal fines, and exclusion from
Medicare and Medicaid.301
The biggest concern with employing the RCO doctrine is that individuals who
are not culpable in the traditional sense may be punished with substantial fines and
exclusion from federal health care programs. If sticking with a purely utilitarian
justification for punishment, then it is sometimes justifiable to punish the innocent
if the benefit to society outweighs the harm.302 It is not clear that is the case here.
The government would essentially be using these prosecutions to make examples
out of high-level officials in the company. But this sends a bad message to
individuals within the health care industry. It is one thing to structure enforcement
of the laws to encourage supervision and monitoring and to penalize the
corporation for its failure to do so. It is another thing to single out executives who
did not have a hand in the wrongdoing for punishment based, in large part, on their
positions in the company. The government would likely argue, however, that
prosecuting executives who fail to prevent or correct illegal conduct is “no more
stringent [a standard] than the public has a right to expect of those who voluntarily
assume positions of authority in business enterprises whose services and products
affect the health and well-being of the public that supports them.”303 That reasoning
probably holds true in an egregious case where the executive turns a blind eye to

297. Park, 421 U.S. at 673–74.
298. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
299. Park, 421 U.S. at 673 (quoting United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376
U.S. 86, 91 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
300. Id.
301. As the law currently stands, OIG may exclude an executive of a convicted
corporation from Medicare and Medicaid, but if the executive resigned from the corporation
before conviction, he or she could escape exclusion. 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7(b)(15) (2006)
(referring to an individual “who is an officer or managing employee” (emphasis added)).
Thus, U.S. Representative Pete Stark recently introduced bipartisan legislation that would
close this loophole and allow OIG to pursue exclusion of executives that have left their
companies. See Strengthening Medicaid Anti-Fraud Measures Act of 2010, H.R. 6130, 111th
Cong. (2010), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_
cong_bills &docid=f:h6130ih.txt.pdf (changing the language of the Social Security Act to
apply to an individual who currently is or “was such an officer or managing employee at the
time of any of the conduct that formed a basis for the conviction”).
302. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 223, at 454.
303. Park, 421 U.S. at 672.
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misconduct. If the employees are hiding the misconduct, however, it is hard to
understand how society benefits from using the moral condemnation of the criminal
law against the executive rather than the employee.
Although the Supreme Court did indicate the need for some “blameworthiness”
on the part of the prosecuted individual, it is not clear how stringently the FDA will
apply this requirement. The FDA recently amended its Regulatory Procedures
Manual to instruct FDA personnel to consider “the individual’s position in the
company and relationship to the violation, and whether the official had the
authority to correct or prevent the violation.”304 But that is nothing more than a
recitation of the standard the Supreme Court set forth in Park and Dotterweich. The
Regulatory Procedures Manual also sets forth seven factors for FDA personnel to
consider, including (1) whether the violation harmed or could harm the public; (2)
“[w]hether the violation is obvious”; (3) whether the violation is part of a pattern of
misconduct; (4) “[w]hether the violation is widespread”; (5) the seriousness of the
violation; (6) the quality of the evidence in support of the prosecution; and (7)
whether the prosecution is a good use of agency resources.305 With respect to
blameworthiness, one could certainly argue that if a violation is obvious, serious,
widespread, and part of a pattern of misconduct, then the executive in charge is at
fault for not identifying and correcting the misconduct. But, as the FDA notes in its
Regulatory Procedures Manual, “it would be futile to attempt to define or indicate
by way of illustration either the categories of persons that may bear a responsible
relationship to a violation or the types of conduct that may be viewed as causing or
contributing to a violation of the Act.”306 Thus, the guidance is not a guarantee that
the FDA will use the RCO doctrine sparingly or only in the most egregious
circumstances. After its success prosecuting Purdue Pharma executives under the
RCO doctrine,307 it is possible that the FDA will shift its enforcement strategy to
prosecuting individuals. If the FDA begins to use the RCO doctrine aggressively, it
may discourage talented compliance professionals or other executives from
working for large health care companies for fear that they will be held criminally
liable for millions of dollars or excluded from participation in Medicare or
Medicaid, which would make them unemployable in the health care industry.308

304. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, SPECIAL PROCEDURES
CONSIDERATIONS FOR PARK DOCTRINE PROSECUTIONS § 6-5-3 (2011), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/ucm176738.h
tm#SUB6-5-3.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See infra note 308.
308. See, e.g., CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND PURDUE PHARMA L.P.
(2007), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/CIAPurdue.pdf. Purdue
Pharma’s former president and CEO, the Chief Legal Officer, and the Chief Medical Officer
pled guilty to misdemeanor misbranding charges in 2007. Friedman v. Sebelius, 755 F.
Supp. 2d 98, 100–02 & 101 n.5 (D.D.C. 2010). In total, they paid $34.5 million in criminal
fines. Id. at 102 n.7. The three executives were charged as Responsible Corporate Officers.
Id. at 100. After the executives’ guilty pleas, OIG moved to exclude them from federal
health care programs for twenty years under the agency’s permissive exclusion authority in
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2006). Id. at 102–03. That statute permits exclusion of individuals
AND
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One way to address the potential criticism of the RCO doctrine on fairness
grounds is to only use it to pursue officers of a repeat offender. Thus, it may be
appropriate to use a CIA and require upper management to make certifications of
compliance the first time that a drug maker runs afoul of the law. If a manufacturer
that is subject to a CIA, or a recently expired CIA, is under investigation for further
marketing violations, the government could pursue the individuals who were
responsible for making certifications under the previous CIA. Because those
individuals would understand that they could be held personally liable for failing to
monitor their employees, they would have a very high incentive to diligently
oversee the marketing activities of their subordinates.
The question, however, is whether punishing individuals within the company
would be a more effective deterrent than pursuing the corporation. Although some
may argue that prosecution of individuals is more likely to deter corporate actors
than prosecution of corporations, scholars such as Professor Geraldine Szott Moohr
have argued that corporate crime does not occur simply because of the “ethical and
moral lapses of executives and employees.”309 The fact is that pharmaceutical
manufacturers can encourage illegal conduct through the policies that they
employ.310 For example, the incentive structure for pharmaceutical sales
representatives encourages them to engage in off-label promotional activities. A
sales representative is incentivized by the number of calls, that is, drug detailing
visits to a physician, and by the number of prescriptions written by that physician
and filled by a pharmacy. “In a standard [drug] detailing session, a rep[resentative]
generally describes a drug’s approved uses and provides an overview of the safety
profile.”311 Because a representative details numerous physicians, the representative
often collects anecdotal evidence of how doctors are prescribing products for
additional indications. Representatives then share that information with clients even
if it deviates from the approved detail for the product because it may expand the
product uses and increase the likelihood of prescription, thus adding to the
representative’s income.312 Ethical drug promotion requires vigilance from the
company and financial remuneration that does not encourage these practices.313
Even if deterrence is better served by prosecuting corporations, the reality is that
the government is not going to prosecute the company because of its concern of
convicted of a misdemeanor “related to fraud . . . in connection with the delivery of a health
care item or service.” Id. at 103; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a). The HHS Departmental
Appeals Board upheld the exclusion but reduced it to twelve years. Friedman, 755 F. Supp.
2d at 104. On December 13, 2010, a federal district court judge upheld the exclusion order.
See id. at 117.
309. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Of Bad Apples and Bad Trees: Considering Fault-Based
Liability for the Complicit Corporation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1343, 1346–47 (2007).
310. See id. at 1347.
311. Jonathan Pan, Off-Label Use: A Double-Edged Sword for the Pharmaceutical
Industry, SCIENTA ADVISORS BLOG (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.scientiaadv.com/blog/2011/
01/04/off-label-use-%E2%80%93-a-double-edged-sword-for-the-pharmaceutical-industry/.
312. See id.
313. Id.; see also Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of
Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of
Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 34–35 & nn.198–207 (2003) (presenting research
demonstrating that compensation based on outcomes, like reaching profit goals, does not
lead to ethical decision making).
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harming innocent individuals. Thus, the advantage to the use of the RCO doctrine
is that there will be criminal responsibility for the illegal conduct.
D. Targeted Exclusion
If the harm from off-label promotion is that the government and the public have
been defrauded, then some form of exclusion may be needed to protect the
government and the public from the unscrupulous manufacturer. Congress could
amend the Social Security Act to provide a new exclusion remedy for use against
pharmaceutical companies.314 In particular, if a pharmaceutical company is
convicted of fraud due to its promotion of a drug for off-label uses or the payment
of kickbacks, the Social Security Act should permit HHS to exclude the improperly
promoted drug from the federal health care programs. If, for example, Pfizer were
convicted of fraud in connection with marketing Bextra for off-label uses, Bextra
would be excluded from reimbursement under the federal health care programs. As
a result, the Medicare and Medicaid programs would not reimburse patients for
Bextra prescriptions but would reimburse for all other Pfizer drugs.
To avoid the resultant harm to patients who use the excluded drug, however, the
Social Security Act would also need to be amended to require the manufacturer to
cover the cost of the excluded drug for Medicare and Medicaid patients who have
prescriptions for that drug. This is necessary to prevent an interruption in treatment
for innocent patients. Once a patient has found a drug that works well for the
treatment of a disease, the patient should not have to become a guinea pig for other
medications simply because the drug manufacturer engaged in misconduct.
A targeted exclusion remedy is likely to deter drug manufacturers more than the
continued use of CIAs because the higher likelihood of enforcement will force drug
manufacturers to reevaluate the potential penalty that they will face upon detection
of the fraud. The penalty will include: the fine imposed as a result of violating the
FCA and FDCA; the loss of Medicare and Medicaid revenue from the excluded
drug over the five-year exclusion period; and the cost of providing the excluded
drug free of charge to Medicare and Medicaid patients for the five-year exclusion
period. The addition of the requirement that manufacturers provide the excluded
drug to Medicare and Medicaid patients is warranted because the added benefit it
brings—reduction of harm to innocent patients—outweighs the harm that it
imposes on the culpable manufacturer. After reevaluating the penalty to be
imposed, pharmaceutical manufacturers should reach the conclusion that the
increased profit to be gained from off-label promotion would be outweighed by the
cost of the fine and the five-year exclusion of the improperly promoted drug.
Unlike the current exclusion remedy, there is little deterrence spillover onto
innocent employees and patients. Although the exclusion of an improperly
marketed drug from reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid would cut off a
significant source of revenue for a pharmaceutical company, it would not be nearly
as devastating to the company, its employees, and patients as blanket exclusion.
The likelihood of the manufacturer collapsing is dramatically lower than with

314. Although this Article focuses on pharmaceutical manufacturers, the new exclusion
remedy would be equally applicable to medical device manufacturers.
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blanket exclusion. Further, the manufacturer would not need to engage in a costcutting campaign to compensate for a huge reduction in revenue. Admittedly, as
with any fine, the cost may be passed onto consumers in the form of higher drug
prices. Because the remedy is targeted squarely at the manufacturer that caused the
harm, however, there is a greater likelihood that the government will be willing to
enforce the remedy.
A targeted exclusion remedy would give the government a credible remedy to
use against pharmaceutical manufacturers that engage in health care fraud and
abuse. The government would no longer need to make the empty threat of blanket
exclusion. Ultimately, however, the deterrent effect of a targeted exclusion remedy
would largely depend on whether the government is willing to change its
enforcement strategy from repeated use of CIAs to the use of both CIAs (when
appropriate) and targeted exclusion. If the government decides that its first strategy
is to pursue reform through a CIA, it must be willing to go after the manufacturer
and seek exclusion if the manufacturer violates the CIA by engaging in improper
promotion during the period of the CIA. Otherwise, the targeted exclusion remedy,
just like the blanket exclusion remedy, will underdeter pharmaceutical
manufacturers.
One of the biggest costs of targeted exclusion will be that the government likely
will spend money administering and/or supervising the pharmaceutical company’s
fulfillment of the requirement of covering the cost of the excluded drug for
Medicare and Medicaid patients. There could be great difficulty in compiling a list
of Medicare and Medicaid patients who would be eligible for the excluded drug at
no cost. The list also would require constant updates as new Medicare and
Medicaid patients obtain prescriptions for the excluded drug. In addition, unlike
CIAs where manufacturers bear the cost of monitoring, here the government would
incur the cost either because the government is administering the fund or because it
is supervising the manufacturer’s administration of the fund.
Perhaps this proposal would increase the number of cases that actually go to
court, thus placing more of a burden on the judicial system. But the upside would
be that the administration of justice would be furthered. Prosecutors would be
forced to test their legal theories (misbranding, introduction of a new drug, etc.)
regarding off-label promotion, and the adjudication of these cases will clarify the
law of off-label promotion. Thus, instead of simply having guidance documents
from the FDA on what will or will not violate the laws prohibiting off-label
marketing, we will have definitive opinions from the courts interpreting the FDCA.
Importantly, in addition to clarifying the law, targeted exclusion would prevent the
exclusion remedy from being circumvented. Prosecutors would not have to agree to
exclude a subsidiary to prevent the exclusion from having an adverse impact on the
manufacturer. Instead, the illegally marketed drug would be excluded, which would
be more in line with the statutory purpose.
CONCLUSION
The current approach of using Corporate Integrity Agreements as a
one-size-fits-all solution to health care fraud is not sustainable. The large penalties
and CIA-demanded reforms that are intended to deter manufacturers from
re-engaging in illegal promotional practices have become nothing more than the
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cost of doing business. Pharmaceutical manufacturers have all too often returned to
their pre-CIA illegal promotional activities because they know that the government
will not harm innocent third parties by imposing blanket exclusions. Thus, CIAs
underdeter manufacturers because the government does not have a plausible
remedy of increasing severity to impose in the event that the manufacturer violates
the CIA. Therefore, the government needs to consider alternative remedies to CIAs
that could be used for repeat offenders of the marketing rules. Each of the remedies
discussed in this Article—funding clinical trials, compulsory licensing, corporate
officer liability, and targeted exclusion—could be used to increase the severity of
punishment if a manufacturer violates a CIA. The government would need to weigh
the costs and benefits of the various alternatives before deciding which sanction
would be most appropriate given the circumstances of the offender and the offense.
The ultimate choice among the alternatives matters little. The important thing is
that the government raises the stakes for pharmaceutical manufacturers so that they
will think twice before violating an existing CIA. This change of course is
necessary if the government is serious about enforcing integrity in drug promotion.

